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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate gains from strategy revisions in deterministic evolutionary
dynamics. To clarify the gain from revision, we propose a framework to reconstruct an evolu-
tionary dynamic from optimal decision with stochastic (possibly restricted) available action set
and switching cost. Many major dynamics and interesting new dynamics can be constructed in
this framework. We formally define net gains from revisions and obtain several general prop-
erties of the gain function, which leads to Nash stability of contractive games—generalization
of concave potential games—and local asymptotic stability of a regular evolutionary stable
state. The unifying framework allows us to apply the Nash stability to mixture of heteroge-
neous populations, whether heterogeneity is in payoffs or in revision protocols. While the
analysis here is confined to general strategic-form games, we finally discuss that the idea of
reconstructing evolutionary dynamics from optimization with switching costs and focusing on
net revision gains for stability is promising for further applications to more complex situations.
Keywords: evolutionary dynamics, dynamic stability, evolutionary stable state, Lyapunov func-
tion, contractive/negative definite/ stable games, passivity, evolutionary implementation
JEL classification: C73, C62, C61
∗The paper was presented at Tohoku, Kyoto, Hitotsubashi, Game Theory Society world congress and Stony Brook
international game theory conference. The author thanks to Takashi Akamatsu, Kajii Atsushi, Shota Fujishima, Daisuke
Oyama, Chiaki Hara, Daisuke Hirata, Ryo Itoh, Yusuke Kasuya, Tatsuhito Kohno, Jonathan Newton, Bill Sandholm,
Karl Schlag, Ryoji Sawa, Tadashi Sekiguchi, Jeff Shamma, and the participants at these presentations for valuable com-
ments.
†Department of Economics, Temple University, 1301 Cecil B. Moore Ave., RA 873 (004-04), Philadelphia, PA 19122,
U.S.A. Tel:+1-215-204-8880. E-mail: zusai@temple.edu.
1
ar
X
iv
:1
80
5.
04
89
8v
2 
 [c
s.G
T]
  2
6 N
ov
 20
18
1 Introduction
Evolutionary dynamics are constructed from aggregation of inertial and myopic decision pro-
cesses of agents in large population (Sandholm, 2010b). An agent switches the action only occa-
sionally. The rule for an agent to choose a new action is prescribed in some “revision protocol,”
such as best response, imitation, pairwise payoff comparison, etc. Revision processes of individu-
als are aggregated to a differential equation that describes the transition of the action distribution
over time; a variety of dynamics comes from a variety of revision protocols.
Dynamic stability of equilibrium is naturally the central issue in the study of these various de-
terministic evolutionary dynamics. In this paper, we verify local stability of a (regular) evolution-
ary stable state under a general class of non-imitative evolutionary dynamics, which includes best
response dynamic, pairwise comparison dynamics, and excess payoff dynamics. Global stability
of Nash equilibria in contractive games is proven as a preliminary step. While these properties
have been proven for several major dynamics separately,1 we find a single universally applicable
and also economically intuitive idea of the proof that encompasses the aforementioned evolution-
ary dynamics. The single universal proof guarantees that we can extend these stability results to
the social dynamic in which different agents follow different protocols and have different payoff
functions. Also, construction of the proof based on economic intuition promises that we can expect
stability without identifying the dynamic as long as agents’ decision rules meet a few economic
and informational assumptions, which basically require that their choices can be rationalized as
optimal choice (possibly) under a restricted available action set and/or a stochastic switching cost.
While we restrict our attention to evolution in the strategic form of a game, we believe that
our idea of the proof can be applicable to more complex situations, such as concurrent play of
multiple games (Sawa and Zusai, 2016). Further, the construction of evolutionary dynamics in
this paper does not require an agent to have ad hoc knowledge of the payoff structure or even
the current payoffs of all feasible choices or to observe other agents’ choices. This parsimony in
agents’ information may be useful for design of distributional controls over decentralized systems
with a large number of feasible choices, such as implementation of optimal network formation and
traffic flows.
Dynamic stability and Lyapunov function. As in other studies of dynamic systems, a Lyapunov
function is the key mathematical tool to prove dynamic stability. A Lyapunov function is a scalar-
valued function to measure how far the current state is from stable sets (Theorem 2). Dynamic
stability can be established just by finding such a function whose value changes monotonically
over time until the state reaches equilibrium. Sandholm (2001) proves that in potential games, the
potential function can be used as a Lyapunov function commonly under various major evolution-
ary dynamics; the potential function is indeed a scalar-valued function to summarize the payoff
vector function in the sense that the gradient vector of the potential always coincides with the
1See Hofbauer and Sandholm (2009) and Fox and Shamma (2013) for the recent study on convergence results in
contractive games.
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relative payoff vector (Definition 1). But, a game fails to have a potential function just by slight
change in the payoff function, unless it keeps “externality symmetry” (Sandholm, 2001).2
Without a potential function, there is no obvious common choice for a Lyapunov function.
Generally the choice of a Lyapunov function depends on specification of the dynamic and the
game. Hofbauer and Sandholm (2009) define a class of games, called contractive games (Defini-
tion 2);3 a contractive game is characterized by a negative marginal effect of a switch between
arbitrary two strategies on the relative payoff of the new strategy compared to the old strategy.
The game with a concave potential game is contractive. But a contractive game may not have a
potential function. They verify stability of Nash equilibrium set in contractive games for various
canonical evolutionary dynamics by finding a Lyapunov function specifically for each canonical
dynamic. Fox and Shamma (2013) further propose to separate a mathematical property needed
on the dynamic, δ-passivity (Definition 4) from the property of the game that contributes to global
stability. However, left unanswered is what happens if those dynamics are mixed, or if agents do
not follow the dynamic exactly, and what is the general economic intuition behind Nash stability
in contractive games.
Gains from revisions of strategies. To obtain a scalar-valued function to measure how “far”
the current state is from an equilibrium, it would be natural for economists to look at gains from
revisions of strategies and sum up the possible gains of all the agents. If agents have settled down
to an equilibrium, there would be no gain from revisions; such a gain would be the incentive
for an agent to revise the strategy, as long as they respond to incentives more or less rationally.
Zusai (2018b) and Sawa and Zusai (2016) exploit this idea to construct a Lyapunov function in
contractive games under versions of best response dynamics.4 But, to put this idea into other
evolutionary dynamics, there seems a gap between myopic rational choice under the BRD and
bounded rationality in those other evolutionary dynamics. While a rational agent should always
switch to the optimal action to achieve the greatest gain from the switch, an evolutionary agent
may take some other suboptimal action and/or may be less likely to implement the switch as the
gain become more negligible; this bounded rationality is common under almost all evolutionary
dynamics except the best response dynamic. As the agent does not fully exploit the possible payoff
gain, the aggregate (gross) gain may not steadily decrease or not vanish to zero as we argue at the
end of Section 3.
2It means that the marginal effects of switch from one action to another on payoff difference between arbitrary two
actions are completely the same across any pair of actions to switch and any pair of actions whose payoffs are affected.
See the paragraph below Definition 1.
3This terminology follows Sandholm (2013). Originally, Hofbauer and Sandholm (2009) call it a stable game. It is
also called a negative semidefinite game.
4The former introduces stochastic switching cost to the BRD and defines the tempered best response dynamic; it will be
discussed as an example of evolutionary dynamics that are covered in our framework. The latter considers a concurrent
play of multiple games and defines the multitasking BRD by allowing an agent to switch the action only in either one
game. This dynamic does not satisfy Assumption A1 and thus the theorems in this paper cannot be applied, though
they adopt the idea of a gain.
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Constructing evolutionary dynamics from optimization with limited action set and switching
costs. To resolve this puzzle and to provide a unified approach to the analysis of equilibrium
stability, this paper proposes a new framework to construct evolutionary dynamics. In this paper,
we construct a dynamic from an optimization protocol like the best response dynamic; but, to
justify switches to suboptimal actions and reluctance to a switch for a small gain, we allow the
protocol to restrict the available action set and also to impose a switching cost of abandoning the
current action; they are further allowed to be random.
There have been a few studies to put each of these two modifications into some specific dynam-
ics; Zusai (2018b) introduces stochastic switching costs into the best response dynamic. Benaı¨m
and Raimond (2010) and Bravo and Faure (2015) consider stochastic restriction on the available ac-
tion set in fictitious play and reinforcement learning, respectively, though they find that long-run
outcomes of these learning processes are captured by the standard best response dynamic. In con-
trast, this paper combines these two factors and indeed investigates common general properties
inherited with all the dynamics that fit into the framework, rather than a particular dynamic. Our
formulation of evolutionary dynamics from such an optimization protocol with a restricted action set
and switching costs includes many of major deterministic evolutionary dynamics, such as the BRD,
pairwise payoff comparison dynamics, and excess payoff dynamics (with a little twist), as well as
some potentially interesting variations of these.
Under this framework, we can formally define the net gain from a switch concretely as the pay-
off improvement by the switch minus the switching cost. A revising agent optimizes the new action
to maximize this net payoff improvement within the available action set. The switch to a subopti-
mal action is justified by restriction on the available action set. Dependency of the likelihood to
actually switch the action is justified by the stochastic switching cost.
Assumptions for equilibrium stationarity and stability. The construction from constrained op-
timization guarantees stationarity of Nash equilibrium in general and Nash stability in potential
games under mild assumptions. First, any action should be available with a positive probability
(Assumption A1). Second, regardless of the incumbent action, the probability that a subset of
other actions becomes available should be kept the same (A2). Lastly, the switching cost must be
non-negative but can be arbitrarily close to zero with some positive probability (Q1). These are
satisfied by major dynamics, including imitative dynamics such as the replicator dynamic (as long
as the initial population state is completely mixed).
We further make another assumption that the probability distribution of available action sets
does not change with the current distribution of actions taken by agents over the population (A3).
This assures that, if the payoff vector is fixed, the net gain decreases as an agent switches to a
better action. While the payoff vector may change in a game and this change may refuel the
gain in general, this possibility is prevented by negative externality in a contractive game. This
assumption narrows our focus to non-observational dynamics, i.e., the dynamics under which the
revision protocol uses (at most) only the current payoff vector but no other information about
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other agents’ choices.
We say a dynamic is rationalizable if it satisfies all these assumptions. This class of dynamics
includes the BRD, pairwise payoff comparison dynamics, etc. On the other hand, it excludes
imitative dynamics; they are known to have only weaker (Lyapunov) stability of Nash equilibria
in contractive games (Lahkar and Sandholm, 2008; Sandholm, Dokumacı, and Lahkar, 2008).
General dynamic stability of a regular ESS. Dynamic stability of an evolutionary stable state
(ESS) was initially an issue for biologists, primarily about replicator dynamics (Taylor and Jonker,
1978).5 In contrast, as economists use various evolutionary dynamics, it has been discussed over
decades whether evolutionary stability is assured to imply dynamic stability in economic dynam-
ics. Friedman (1991), a seminal paper to consider a general class of evolutionary dynamics in
economic contexts, argues that stability of a regular ESS is not generally guaranteed in economic
evolutionary dynamics. As a fairly general criterion of “compatiblility” of an evolutionary dy-
namic with incentives, Friedman suggests that the net increase in the mass of players of a better
action should be greater than that of a worse action. He presents a counterexample in which some
compatible dynamics fail to converge to the unique interior regular ESS in a strictly contractive
game.6 On the other hand, based on the Lyapunov function for contractive games in Hofbauer
and Sandholm (2009), Sandholm (2010a) verifies dynamic stability of a regular ESS under major
evolutionary dynamics; while Sandholm presents an idea to build up the Lyapunov function for a
regular ESS from the one for contractive games as a base, the base Lyapunov function was specific
to each dynamic. So the core general economic principle has been unanswered.
We fill the gap between Friedman’s negative view and Sandholm’s positive view. While we
follow Sandholm’s idea and make it more mathematically explicit and general (Theorem 6), our
general approach to use the gain as a Lyapunov function assures general dynamic stability of a reg-
ular ESS in rationalizable dynamics (Corollary 6). In Section 5.2 and Appendix D.1, we compare
the behavioral and informational structure behind our rationalizable dynamics and those behind
Friedman’s compatible dynamics and find that both are not mutually exclusive or inclusive due
to the difference in the way to define commonality in economic dynamics.
Outline. Our analysis goes step by step. We construct evolutionary dynamics from constrained
optimization in the next section and verify general properties of rationalizable dynamics such as
Nash stationarity. Section 3 starts from clarifying mathematics such as a Lyapunov function for
the study of equilibrium stability and explains how the idea of a gain is promising and why we
still need to refine it. In Section 4, we define the net gain for an individual revising agent and the
aggregate net gain over the society and obtain several basic properties of the net gain function.
Using these properties of the gain function, we prove Nash stability in contractive games and
local stability of a regular ESS in Section 5. Section 6 presents how our idea and results are applied
5See Cressman (2008) for a concise survey, accessible for economists.
6Even if we focus on excess payoff dynamics, payoff monotonicity does not guarantee dynamic stability of equilib-
ria in a contractive game or a regular ESS; see (Hofbauer and Sandholm, 2009, Section 6).
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to major dynamics. Section 7 extends them to a heterogeneous setting. Appendix includes a
little modified application of the base framework to excess payoff dynamics and mathematical
theorems on a Lyapunov function as well as the proofs of theorems in the main text.
2 Base model
2.1 Single-population game
As a base model, we consider a finite-action game played in the society of continuously many
homogeneous agents.7 The society consists of a unit mass of agents. In this base model, they are
homogeneous in the sense that they have the same action set and the same payoff function.
More specifically, each agent chooses an action a from A := {1, . . . , A}. Denote by xa ∈ [0, 1]
the mass of action-a players in the society. The social state is represented by a column vector
x := (x1, . . . , xA) in X := ∆A.8 The tangent space of X is TX = RA0 .
The payoff of each action is a function of the social state; in social state x ∈ X , Fa(x) is the
payoff for a player of action a ∈ A. Define payoff function F : X → RA by
F(x) :=

F1(x)
...
FA(x)
 for each x ∈ X .
Throughout this paper, we assume that the payoff function F : X → RA is continuously differen-
tiable.
As usual, a Nash equilibrium is a state where (almost) every agent takes an optimal action.
Formally, a social state x ∈ X is a Nash equilibrium if Fa(x) ≥ Fb(x) for all b ∈ A whenever
xa > 0, or equivalently
(y− x) · F(x) ≤ 0 for all y ∈ X .
Denote by NE(F) the set of Nash equilibria in population game F.
In a single-population setting, an evolutionary stable state is defined by requiring x to satisfy
a stronger condition: there is a neighborhood O of x such that
(y− x) · F(y) ≤ 0 for all y ∈ O \ {x}. (1)
If we see the social state as a mixed strategy, the condition requires the equilibrium strategy x to
be strictly better than y when the population state switches completely to y. Under continuous
differentiability, this definition is equivalent to x being a Nash equilibrium and the existence of a
7For further details, see Sandholm (2010b, Ch.2).
8We omit the transpose when we write a column vector on the text. The vector in a bold font is a column vector,
while the one with an arrow over the letter is a row vector. 1 is a column vector (1, 1, . . . , 1). Note that 1 · z = ∑ni=1 zi for
an arbitrary column vector z = (zi)ni=1 ∈ Rn. For a finite set A = {1, . . . , A}, we define ∆A as ∆A := {x = (xa)a∈A ∈
[0, 1]A | 1 · x = 1}, i.e., the set of all probability distributions on A, and RA0 := {z ∈ RA | 1 · z = 0}.
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neighborhood O of x such that for any y ∈ O \ {x}
(y− x) · F(y) < 0 whenever (y− x) · F(x) = 0.
The simplest example of a population game is single-population random matching in a sym-
metric two-player normal-form game with an A × A payoff matrix Π; the population game is
defined by F(x) = Πx. NE(F) coincides with the set of symmetric Nash equilibria of Π. Besides, if
such a game has an interior ESS, then this random matching game is a contractive game.
Potential games
Definition 1 (Potential game: Sandholm (2001)). A population game F : X → RA is called a
potential game if there is a scalar-valued continuously differentiable function f : X → R whose
gradient vector always coincides with the relative payoff vector: for all x ∈ X , f satisfies9
∂ f
∂xa
(x) = Fa(x)− F¯(x) for all a ∈ A, i.e.,
[
d f
dx
(x)
]T
= F(x)− F¯(x)1.
The class of potential games includes random matching in symmetric games, binary choice
games and standard congestion games. The potential function f works as a Lyapunov function in
a wide range of evolutionary dynamics: replicator, BRD, etc.: see Sandholm (2001). It is known
(Sandholm, 2001) that the potential game is equivalent to externality symmetry: ∂Fa/∂xb(x) =
∂Fb/∂xa(x) for all a, b ∈ A, x ∈ ∆A. As this is defined by an equality condition, the potential
function may be lost by a small perturbation to the payoff function.
Contractive games
Definition 2 (Contractive game: Hofbauer and Sandholm (2009)). A population game F is a con-
tractive game if
(y− x) · (F(y)− F(x)) ≤ 0 for all x, y ∈ X . (2)
If the strict inequality holds whenever x 6= y, F is a strict contractive game.
If F is C1, the definition of a contractive game is equivalent to negative semidefiniteness of the
Jacobian matrix of F with respect to the tangent space TX of the state space X : for any x ∈ X ,10
z · DF(x)z ≤ 0 for any z ∈ TX . (3)
The class of contractive games includes two-player zero-sum games as well as single-population
random matching in a normal-form game with an interior evolutionary stable state or neutrally
9You may notice that X is only a subspace ofRA. The gradient d fdx (x) here means the coefficient vector in the linear
approximation of change in f on the tangent space of X , i.e., f (x + z) = f (x) + d fdx (x)z + o(|z|) for all z ∈ TX .
10For differentiable function f = ( fi)mi=1 : R
n → Rm with input variable z = (zj)nj=1, we denote the Jacobian of f by
Df or df/dz; ∂ fi/∂zj locates on the i-th row and the j-th column of df/dz.
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stable state. As a strict contractive game is defined by a strict inequality condition, it is robust to
small perturbation to the payoff function.
Regular ESS
In the literature on dynamic stability of an ESS, a slightly stronger version of an ESS, a regular
ESS, has been studied to exploit differentiability of F (Taylor and Jonker, 1978; Friedman, 1991;
Sandholm, 2010a); and so do we here. One would immediately notice that condition ii) suggests a
local version of strict contractiveness (3), when restricted to a tangent spaceRAS0 of support of x
∗.
Definition 3 (Regular ESS: Taylor and Jonker 1978). x∗ is a regular evolutionary stable state if it
satisfies both of the following two conditions:
i) x∗ is a quasi-strict equilibrium:
Fs(x∗) = F∗(x∗) > Fu(x∗) whenever x∗s > 0 = x∗u ;
ii) DF(x∗) is negative definite with respect to RAS0:
z · DF(x∗)z < 0 for all z ∈ RAS0 \ {0}.
Here S is the set of actions used in x∗, i.e., S := {b ∈ A | x∗b > 0}; and, let
RAS0 :=
{
z ∈ RA | [zb = 0 for any b /∈ S] and ∑
a∈A
za = 0
}
= {z ∈ RA0 | zb = 0 if x∗b = 0}.
Let U := A \ S = {a ∈ A | x∗a = 0}. Notice that a regular ESS is an isolated Nash equilibrium
(Bomze and Weibull, 1995), in the sense that x∗ is the only Nash equilibrium of F in a small enough
neighborhood of x∗. If Nash equilibrium x∗ is in the interior of x∗ (i.e., it is completely mixed) and
DF(x∗) is negative definite, then it is a regular ESS. The regular ESS extends this to a boundary of
X , where some actions are not used. A regular ESS is an ESS, since condition ii) implies (1); if F is
linear, these two conditions coincide. Taylor and Jonker (1978) argues that generically every ESS
is regular.
2.2 Rationalizable evolutionary dynamic
General formulation
Here we construct an evolutionary dynamic to formulate transition of the social state over contin-
uous time horizon. In the dynamic, each agent occasionally receives an opportunity to revise the
action, following the Poisson process; the arrival rate is fixed at 1.
Upon receipt of a revision opportunity, a revising agent compares payoffs from the current
action and from other available actions. All other actions are not always available: from incumbent
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action a, the available action set A′a is a subset of A \ {a}. Besides, if the revising agent chooses to
switch an action, the agent needs to pay switching cost q. The switching cost is common to all the
available actions. The agent chooses the action that yields the greatest net payoff: given payoff
vector pi ∈ RA, available action set A′a and switching cost q, the decision problem of the revising
agent who was taking action a ∈ A until this revision opportunity is represented as
max
{
pia, max
b∈A′a
pib − q
}
(4)
Let pi∗[A′a] := maxb∈A′a pib be the greatest (gross) payoff among available actions A′a ⊂ A \ {a},
and b∗(pi; A′a) := argmaxb∈A′a pib be the set of the optimal actions among them, while pi∗ :=
maxb∈A pib denotes the greatest payoff among all the actions A and b∗(pi) := maxb∈A pib the set
of the optimal actions. Note that x ∈ NE(F) is equivalent to x ∈ ∆A(b∗[F(x)]).11
We allow both available action set A′a and switching cost q to be random, though they are de-
termined after the receipt of the revision opportunity but before choosing a new action. Available
action set A′a ⊂ A \ {a} is drawn from probability distribution PAa over 2A\{a}, the power set of
A \ {a}. Switching cost q ∈ R+ is drawn from probability distribution PQ over R+. We assume
that A′a and q are independent of each other, the agent’s current action and the social state, and
also invariant over time.
The revising agent actually switches to either one action in b∗(pi; A′a) if pi∗[A′a]− q > pia; thus
the probability of doing so is Q(pi∗[A′a] − pia), where Q(q) := PQ((−∞, q)) is a non-decreasing
function.12 Otherwise, he chooses to maintain the current action a.
Given that a revising agent was taking action a until this revision opportunity, the probability
distribution of possible changes in her action upon the revision opportunity takes a form of a
probability vector such that
∑
A′a⊂A\{a}
PAa(A′a)Q(pi∗[A′a]− pia)(ya[pi; A′a]− ea) ∈ TX . (5)
Here ya[pi; A′a] ∈ ∆A(b∗[pi; A′a]) is a probability vector that has support over b∗(pi; A′a). If there are
multiple optimum actions that yield the greatest payoff among feasible actions A′a, this probability
vector ya[pi; A′a] cannot be determined uniquely and thus the transition vector may not be unique.
To allow such multiplicity, we formulate the dynamic as a set-valued differential equation, namely,
11Consider a |U |-dimensional real space, each of whose coordinate is labeled with either one element of U =
{1, . . . , |U |}. For a set S ⊂ U , we define a |S|-dimensional simplex ∆|U |(S) in the |U |-dimensional space as
∆|U |(S) :=
{
x ∈ R|U |+ | ∑k∈S xk = 1 and xl = 0 for any l ∈ U \ S
}
. So it is the set of probability vectors whose sup-
port is contained in S.
12For expositional simplicity, we assume that the agent always chooses the current action if pia = pi∗[A′a]− q.
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a differential inclusion. Let Va[pi] be the set of vectors that take the above form:13
Va[pi] := ∑
A′a⊂A\{a}
PAa(A′a)Q(pi∗[A′a]− pia)(∆A(b∗[pi; A′a])− ea).
Aggregating Va[pi] over the whole population, the transition of the social state is represented
by a vector in the set
V(x)[pi] = ∑
a∈A
xaVa[pi] ⊂ TX . (6)
Therefore, in population game F, the dynamic of the social state x is defined as
x˙ ∈ V(x)[F(x)] =: VF(x).
The goal of this paper is to understand general behavioral principles to guarantee dynamic sta-
bility of equilibria commonly over a certain class of games. For this goal, here we have followed
the framework to consruct a dynamic, manifested by Sandholm (2010b). We can see evolution-
ary dynamic V as an operation to generate a dynamic system (differential equation/inclusion)
VF : X ⇒ TX from a game F : X → RA; the evolutionary dynamic V is constructed from a revi-
sion protocol that describes how an agent updates the action in response to change in payoff vector
pi. In the study of equilibrium stability in contractive games, Fox and Shamma (2013) pushes this
approach further; equilibrium stability of VF in a certain game F is obtained by combining proper-
ties of the evolutionary dynamic V and of the game F. They propose to separate these properties.
In Fox and Shamma (2013), they are interested in general properties of F to guarantee the equilib-
rium stability under each of major evolutionary dynamics, possibly because they are in a position
as engineers to design a specific dynamic as a protocol of each artificial agent/console in decen-
trailized distributional control.14 On the other hand, here we are interested in general properties
of V for the equilibrium stability. As economists, we cannot specify the revision protocol of each
living economic/social actor; but rather we aim to find qualitative behavioral principles (as well
as information structures) that are extracted from major evolutionary dynamics by identifying
essential assumptions commonly held in those dynamics.
Assumptions
For our analysis, we make the following assumptions on the revision process.
Assumption Q1. i) Q(q) = 0 if q ≤ 0 and ii) Q(q) > 0 if q > 0.
Assumption A1. For any a ∈ A and any b ∈ A \ {a}, PAa({A′a ⊂ A \ {a} | b ∈ A′a}) > 0.
Assumption Q1 is about the distribution of switching costs. It guarantees that i) switching
cost is nonnegative almost surely and ii) an agent chooses to switch her action with some positive
13In a vector space Z , with a set S ⊂ Z , an element c ∈ Z and a scalar k ∈ R, we define set k(S + c) := {k(z + c) ∈
Z | z ∈ S}; for sets S1, S2 ⊂ Z , we define set S1 + S2 := {z1 + z2 ∈ Z | z1 ∈ S1 and z2 ∈ S2}.
14See Marden and Shamma (2015) on applications of evolutionary dynamics to distributional controls.
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probability whenever there is an available action strictly better than the current action. This is an
essential assumption for Nash stationarity (Corollary 1): the social state x remains unchanged if
and only if it is a Nash equilibrium. Assumption A1 is about the distribution of available action
sets. It implies that, in the ex-ante sense before the realization of the available action set, any action
becomes available with some positive probability. These two assumptions are enough for Nash
stationarity and also equilibrium stability of potential games (Corollary 2).
For equilibrium stability in contractive games, we need two additional assumptions. To obtain
a Lyapunov function by counting possible payoff gains from switches, we expect a better action
to have a smaller payoff gain: the possible increase in the agent’s payoff by a switch is smaller for
an agent who currently takes a better action than an agent taking worse one. The two additional
assumptions below assure this natural conjecture.
Assumption A2. For any a, b ∈ A and Aab ⊂ A \ {a, b}, PAa({A′a | A′a ∩ Aab 6= ∅}) = PAb({A′b |
A′b ∩ Aab 6= ∅}).
Assumption A2 imposes a kind of invariance of the available action distributions conditional
on different initial actions. Here, we compare the distribution of available actions PAa when the
current action is a and the one PAb when it is b. Fix an arbitrary set Aab of actions other than a and
b. The assumption requires PAa and PAb to assign the same probability on the event that at least
one of the actions in Aab become available.
This assumption implies that, given the preference ordering of actions based on the current
payoff vector, for any i ∈ N, the probability that (at least one of) the i-th best actions is available
does not vary whether the current action is a or b, as long as the i-th action is better than both a
and b; so, if a is worse than b, an agent who is currently taking a is more likely to switch than one
currently taking b simply because the former action a has more actions (including b) that are better
than a itself and thus the agent should switch to. When the former agent and the latter switch to
the same action, the former improves the payoff more than the latter. Combining these two facts,
the expected gain by a switch from a should be greater than that from b. Therefore, the ordering of
actions by the expected gains is obtained by simply reversing the ordering by the current payoffs.
The assumption may look a bit complicated. First, it checks the symmetry for each of possible
set Aab ⊂ A \ {a, b}—not for each action c ∈ A \ {a, b}. Second, it checks the probability of the
event that at least one action in the set is available, not simply that the whole set is available.
The first point assures invariance of correlations of any available actions other than a and b. The
second point is made because we do not impose a condition on a set that contains either a or
b—the set containing a is not assigned to a positive probability in PAa when a is the status quo.
The remark after the proof of Lemma 1 in Appendix C.1 presents examples that a change of the
invariance condition in these two points may break the monotone relationship between the gain
ordering and the payoff ordering.
Our formulation itself imposes a few restrictions. One significant restriction is that the dis-
tribution of available action sets does not depend on the social state. This excludes imitative
dynamics such as the replicator dynamic or any observational dynamics in which the availability
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of actions is based on observation of other agents’ choices. We make this restriction explicit in the
next assumption. This assumption implies that the expected payoff gain by a switch changes only
if there is a change in the payoffs of actions. The change in action distribution x affect the gains
not directly, only indirectly through changes in payoffs pi = F(x).
Assumption A3. PA· is independent of x.
If an evolutionary dynamic V can be constructed from (4) with a pair of PA and Q satisfying
Assumptions Q1, A1 and A2, we call it a rationalizable dynamic. Further, if it satisfies Assump-
tion A3, it is said to be regular.
Examples
Rationalizable dynamics include many major and interesting new evolutionary dynamics, as fol-
lows.15
Example 1 (Best response dynamics). It is trivial to fit the standard best response dynamic (BRD)
x˙ ∈ B(x)− x to our framework just by setting PAa(A \ {a}) = 1 for any a ∈ A and Q(q) = 1 for
all q > 0 while Q(0) = 0. That is, every action is always available and switching cost is zero.
Zusai (2018b) generalizes BRD to a tempered BRD (tBRD) by allowing Q to be any nonde-
creasing function that satisfies Assumption Q1. As the tBRD still assumes PAa(A \ {a}) = 1, our
framework could be seen as a further generalization of the tBRDs. But it does indeed expand
generality so widely as to include the following non-optimization based dynamics.
Example 2 (Symmetric pairwise payoff comparison). In a pairwise payoff comparison dynamic, a
revising agent compares the current payoff with the payoff from one randomly picked action and
switches to the latter action with positive probability (conditional switching rate) if and only if the
latter yields a higher payoff than the current payoff. In the protocol for the Smith dynamic, the
conditional switching rate is proportional to the payoff difference between the randomly picked
action b and the current action a. We can generalize it as the probability is determined by increas-
ing function Q : R → [0, 1] such as Q(q) = 0 for any q ≤ 0. So, conditional on b randomly
picked, the rate of switch from a to b is Q([pib − pia]+).16 This dynamic fits with our framework
(4) by setting PAa({b}) = 1/(A− 1) for all b ∈ A \ {a} and defining PQ from this switching rate
function Q. All the assumptions except Assumption Q1 are guaranteed from this construction.
Assumption Q1 is satisfied if Q(q) > 0 for all q > 0; so does Smith dynamic.
Example 3 (BRD on randomly restricted action set). As already stated, the straight interpretation of
our framework on revision protocols is that an agent chooses an action from a randomly restricted
action set as to maximize the net payoff. The assumptions on PA· look very general, while the
above examples might not fully exploit generality of our framework. So it is worth to explore how
15Excess payoff dynamics and smooth BRDs need a few modification of the base framework. It is discussed in
Section 6.
16The block parentheses with a positive sign [·]+ indicates the non-negative part of the argument: i.e, [z]+ = z if
z > 0 and [z]+ = 0 if z ≤ 0.
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we can stretch the reach of our framework beyond these known dynamics with concrete examples
of PA·.
It is easy to confirm the assumptions on PA· in the following examples. But, they do not fall
neither of the major dynamics mentioned above.
Example 3-i. In a revision opportunity, each action other than the current action becomes avail-
able with a certain probability. The availability of each action is independent of
those of others and the probability of each action’s availability is common to all
the actions. This is formulated in PA· as PAa(A′a) = p#A
′
a /(1− (1− p)A−1) with
some p ∈ (0, 1). The denominator is to exclude the case that no action becomes
available.
Example 3-ii. In a revision opportunity, the number of available actions is determined first:
n actions will be available with probability pn ∈ (0, 1) (1 ≤ n ≤ A − 1 and
∑A−1n=1 pn = 1). Given n the number of available actions, each possible set of n
actions is drawn with equal probability as the available action set for the revising
agent. This is formulated as PAa(A′a) = p#A′a /A−1C#A′a .
Interestingly, with the same Q as the standard BRD, these dynamics reduce to dynamics in
which the switching rate depends on the ordinal ranking of a new action based on the current
payoff vector. For example, in Example 3-i, an agent switches to the best action with probability
p, to the second best with probability (1− p)p, and to the i-th best with probability (1− p)i−1 p.17
Nash stationarity in general
The first two assumptions imply stationarity of the dynamic when all agents are currently playing
optimal actions given the payoff vector. When the dynamic is embedded with a population game,
it guarantees stationarity of Nash equilibria. In Theorem 1, part i) is immediate from the construc-
tion of a revision protocol based on constrained optimization, since x ∈ ∆A(b∗[pi]) implies that
no agents find any better action that their current actions and thus they do not switch actions.
The two assumptions, particularly, contribute to part ii) since these assumptions guarantees that
agents who are not currently taking the best action can find a better action and switch to it with
some positive probability.
Theorem 1 (Best response stationarity). Consider an evolutionary dynamic V that satisfies Assumptions
Q1 and A1. Then, i) state x ∈ X is a stationary state given payoff vector pi, i.e., V(x)[pi] = {0}, if almost
all agents are taking only optimal actions given pi in state x, i.e., x ∈ ∆A(b∗[pi]). ii) If x /∈ ∆A(b∗[pi]),
then state x cannot be stationary, i.e., 0 /∈ V(x)[pi].
Corollary 1 (Nash stationarity). Consider an evolutionary dynamic V that satisfies Assumptions Q1 and
A1. Then, in any population game F, state x is stationary under the dynamic VF, i.e., VF(x) = {0} if and
only if x is a Nash equilibrium in F.
17I would like thank Bill Sandholm to call my attention to this ordinal property.
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3 Lyapunov function and gains
3.1 Lyapunov stability theorem
In any study of dynamical systems, a Lyapunov function is a common tool to prove stability of
equilibrium. In this paper, we will use the following version of the Lyapunov stability theorem
for a differential inclusion.18
Theorem 2 (extended from Zusai 2018b: Theorem 7). Let X∗ be a closed set in a compact metric space
X with a tangent space TX , and X′ be a neighborhood of X∗. Suppose that two continuous functions
W : X → R and W˜ : X → R satisfy (a) W(x) ≥ 0 and W˜(x) ≤ 0 for all x ∈ X′ and (b) cl X′ ∩
W−1(0) = X′ ∩ W˜−1(0) = X∗. In addition, assume that W is Lipschitz continuous in x ∈ X′. i) If a
differential inclusion V : X → TX satisfies
d
dx
W(x)x˙ ≤ W˜(x) for any x˙ ∈ V(x) at each x ∈ X′, (7)
then X∗ is asymptotically stable under V . ii) If X′ is forward invariant, i.e., every Carathe´odory solution
{xt} starting from X′ at time 0 remains in X′ for all moments of time t ∈ [0,∞), then X′ is a basin of
attraction to X∗.
We call W a Lyapunov function and W˜ a decaying rate function. Note that we allow multiplicity
of transition vectors, while requiring functions G and H to be well defined (the uniqueness of the
values) as functions of the state variable x, independently of the choice of a transition vector x˙
from V(x).
In the preceding literature, different Lyapunov functions are proposed to prove global stabil-
ity of Nash equilibria in a contractive game; see Figure 2 in Section 6. Our goal is to find a com-
mon idea behind these different forms of Lyapunov functions, which should be nested in some
commonality that held over these different evolutionary revision protocols and also the nature of
contractive games.
For this, we want to clarify how the commonality over different protocols and the contractive-
ness of the payoff function contribute to the construction of a Lyapunov function. In line with
the modeling approach to define evolutionary dynamic V separately from game/payoff function
F (Sandholm, 2010b), Jeff Shamma regards V as a system to yield x˙ from pi and F as a feedback
system to yield pi from x; then, by seeing x as a state variable and pi as a costate variable, he
18This is modified from the Lyapunov stability theorem in Smirnov (2001, Theorem 8.2). While Smirnov’s version
is applicable to a singleton of an equilibrium point, the theorem here allows convergence to a set of equilibria. Part i)
is added to the one in Zusai (2018b) for clarification; the difference in the two versions is explained and the additional
part is proven in Appendix B.1.
In a standard Lyapunov stability theorem (e.g. Robinson (1998, §5.5.3), Sandholm (2010b, Corollary 7.B.6)) for a
differential equation, a decaying rate function W˜ is not explicitly required though W˙ is assumed to be (strictly) negative
until x reaches the limit set X∗. The most significant difference is the requirement of continuity of W˜. This assures the
existence of a lower bound on the decaying rate W˙(x) ≤ w¯ < 0 in a hypothetical case in which x remains out of an
arbitrarily small neighborhood of X∗ for an arbitrarily long period of time. This excludes the possibility that x stays
there forever; it guarantees convergence to X∗ (not only Lyapunov stability, i.e., no asymptotic escape from X∗).
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proposes to see the game-specific dynamic VF as the integration of the two systems.19 Based on
this viewpoint of game dynamics, Fox and Shamma (2013) define δ-passivity as a mathematical
property on the evolutionary dynamic V .20
Definition 4 (δ-passivity, a slightly extended from Fox and Shamma 2013). Evolutionary dynamic
V : X ×RA ⇒ TX is (δ-)passive, if there exists a pre-Lyapunov function L : X ×RA → R+ and
a pre-decaying rate function L˜ : X ×RA → R− s.t., at any x ∈ X and pi ∈ RA,
∂L
∂x
(x)[pi]∆x +
∂L
∂pi
(x)[pi]∆pi ≤ ∆x · ∆pi + L˜(x)[pi] for any ∆pi ∈ RA and ∆x ∈ V(x)[pi].
In a game F, payoff vector pi is always determined from the current population state x. Thus,
the pre-Lyapunov function L reduces to a function of x given by LF(x) := L(x)[F(x)]; similarly,
L˜F(x) := L˜(x)[F(x)]. If the game F is contractive, then
x˙ · p˙i = x˙ · dF
dx
(x)x˙ ≤ 0 with p˙i = dF
dx
(x)x˙ ∈ RA for any x˙ ∈ TX .
Thus, δ-passivity of evolutionary dynamic V implies (7) for the induced game dynamic VF:
L˙F(x) =
∂L
∂x
(x)[F(x)]x˙ +
∂L
∂pi
(x)[F(x)]
dF
dx
(x)x˙ ≤ x˙ · dF
dx
(x)x˙ + L˜F(x) ≤ L˜F(x).
Roughly speaking, this suggests that we can use LF as a Lyapunov function for dynamic VF,
with L˜F as a decaying rate function to apply Theorem 2, though we need to check a few other
assumptions.
δ-passivity points out exactly the mathematical property that should be satisfied for an evolu-
tionary dynamic V , separately from a game F, in order to guarantee Nash stability of contractive
games. However it does not still tell how to find/construct a pre-Lyapunov function. Our goal is
to find a general principle that is inherited in behavioral/economical aspects of well-behaved evolu-
tionary dynamics.
3.2 Gross gains from revisions
Economists look at decision making through investigation of incentives. In evolutionary dynam-
ics, it is natural to look at gains from revisions of strategies as the incentives for agents’ strategy
revisions. The straightforward idea would lead us to defining the gain simply as the difference
19Shamma (2016). See also Fox and Shamma (2013); Mabrok and Shamma (2016).
20The δ refers to differentiation, i.e., the time derivatives of state and costate variables. Fox and Shamma (2013) add
it to the term in order to distinguish from passivity of the current values of these variables.
Since our version of the Lyapunov stability theorem requires the explicit specification of a continuous function W˜
as a decaying rate function to cover a differential inclusion; the definition of δ-passivity differs from Fox and Shamma
(2013) by including L˜ on the RHS of the defining equation. The decaying rate function is assumed in their Theorem
4.2, possibly to assure (strict) negativity of the LHS out of the limit set, while they seem to apply a standard Lyapunov
stability theorem (precisely, LaSalle’s invariance theorem) for a differential equation and thus do not require continuity
of L˜.
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between the payoff from new strategy and the one from the old strategy. We call this payoff im-
provement from revision an individual gross gain in order to distinguish it from the net gain that
we will define later. It is consistent with the definition of Nash equilibrium as the state of “no
profitable deviation.”
To build a pre-Lyapunov function, we express the expected gain as a function of the current
strategy distribution and the current payoff vector. For a rationalizable dynamic, we define the
individual expected gross gain γ : RA → RA as a function of pi:
γa[pi] := ∑
A′a⊂A\{a}
PAa[A′a]Q(pi∗[A′a]− pia)(pi∗[A′a]− pia).
Here we focus on an agent who has been playing strategy a so far and now receives a revision
opportunity. With probability PAa(A′a), A′a is the set of available strategies. If the agent chooses to
switch to the best available strategy among A′a, then the agent’s payoff increases by pi∗[A′a]− pia;
this is the gross gain that the agent can obtain from this switch of an action. Because of stochastic
switching cost q, a switch of the agent’s action and the improvement of the agent’s payoff take
place only with probability Q(pi∗[A′a] − pia). Summing this over all possible available strategy
sets A′a ⊂ A \ {a}, we obtain γa[pi] as the expected value of possible payoff improvements just
when the agent receives a revision opportunity (but not yet draws the available strategy set or the
switching cost). Let γ[pi] = (γa[pi])a∈A.
Given the current strategy distribution x, the individual gross gains over all agents aggregate
to the (aggregate) gross gain
Γ(x)[pi] := x · γ[pi].
It is immediate from our definition of the gross gain in a rationalizable dynamic that the gross gain
cannot be negative. Further, we can confirm that it is zero if and only if (almost) all agents choose
the optimal strategies given the current payoff vector.
Theorem 3 (Positive expected and aggregate gross gain). Consider an evolutionary dynamic V that
satisfies Assumptions Q1 and A1. Then, i) for any x ∈ X ,pi ∈ RA, we have
za ·pi = γa[pi] ≥ 0 for any a ∈ A, za ∈ Va[pi];
∆x ·pi = Γ(x)[pi] ≥ 0 for any ∆x ∈ V(x)[pi].
ii) Moreover, the equality in the latter holds if and only if x ∈ ∆A(b∗[pi]).
The theorem also gives an alternative form of the gross gain as the sum of the payoff improve-
ments actually realized through the transition of the strategy distribution.21 This alternative form
21To see that ∆x · pi is the sum of the actual increases in revising agents’ payoffs, express the transition vector as
∆x = ∑a∈A xa(ya − ea) where ya is the distribution of new actions for those who have been taking action a before the
revision. Then, we have ∆x · pi = ∑a∈A xa(ya · pi − pia); here, ya · pi is the average payoff of new actions for players
those who have taken action a before the switch and thus ya · pi − pia is their gross gain. Thus, ∆x · pi is the sum of
payoff gains realized from this transition of strategy distribution.
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allows us to interpret the aggregate gross gain as a correlation between the current payoffs pi and
the transitions of strategy choices ∆x.22 The equality with Γ(x)[pi] confirms that the total pay-
off improvements from strategy revisions ∆x · pi is invariant to any choice of possible transition
vectors from the set-valued differential equation ∆x ∈ V(x)[pi].
3.3 Nash stability in potential games
To see the relationship between Nash equilibrium and the gross gain, now we embed the payoff
function F into the gross gain function as ΓF(x) := Γ(x)[F(x)]. If the game possesses a potential
function f , the time derivative of the potential function coincides with the aggregate gain:
d f (xt)
dt
= D f (xt)x˙t = F(xt) · x˙t = ΓF(xt)
for any x˙t ∈ VF(xt). As Sandholm (2001) shows, Theorem 3 immediately implies stability of Nash
equilibria in potential games.
Corollary 2 (Nash stability in potential game). Consider evolutionary dynamic V that satisfies As-
sumptions Q1 and A1. If F is a potential game with potential function f , then NE(F) is globally attracting
under VF. Moreover, each local maximizer of f is Lyapunov stable.
Time-integral and time-derivative of the gross gain in general
The above relation tells us that f (xt) is the integral of ΓF(xt) over the time domain t ∈ R+. Thus,
the existence of a potential function results in the integrability of the aggregate gross gain over the
time domain. Conversely, we could say that the trouble when a game does not have the potential
function would be the absence of such an integrable function whose transition is governed by the
gross gain.
What could we use as a Lyapunov function if there is no potential function? One may try to
use the aggregate gross gain itself as a Lyapunov function. However, the aggregate gross gain is
not guaranteed to change monotonically over time even in a potential game: the time derivative
of ∆x · F(x), which is equal to f¨ in a potential game, may be positive or negative. Nonmonotonic
change in the aggregate gross gain may happen especially if agents do not switch to the best
response at each revision opportunity. Except the standard BRD, agents do not choose the best
response strategy that achieves the greatest payoff and thus the greatest payoff gain. For example,
in pairwise comparison dynamics such as Smith dynamic, agents switch to a sampled action as
long as it is better than the current action. So, agents may leave some of possible gains not wholly
exploited. The remaining possible gains may be greater than the realized gross gains at a moment
of time and the remaining gains may be realized in later periods. This makes the aggregate gross
22For this, positive definiteness of the aggregate gross gain in Theorem 3 matches with “positive correlation” (Sand-
holm, 2010b), though here we would emphasize the implication on gross gains.
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gain change non-monotonically over time. Therefore, we cannot use the gross gain itself as a
Lyapunov function; see Example 4 in Section 5.
4 Switching costs and net gains
4.1 The idea
To resolve the nonmonotonicity of the aggregate gross gain, we should take into account causes
of bounded rationality that prevents agents from achieving the greatest payoff whenever they
receive revision opportunities. As economists, we would think of explaining it by revealing the
“costs” and ”constraints”. We think that agents may not take the optimal strategy, because it is
costly to switch strategy or there is a restriction to available strategies. This is indeed explicitly
formulated as a switching cost and a restricted available strategy set in a rationalizable dynamic.
The gross gain has already taken care of the latter by including PA; now we refine it to the net gain
by subtracting a switching cost q from the gross gain.
In a rationalizable dynamic, an agent who receives a revision opportunity chooses to switch
strategy whenever the net gain is positive and the agent chooses to keep the current strategy if it
is negative. Thus, we obtain a quantitative measure to assess when an agent chooses to switch the
strategy and when not. Unlike the gross gain, an agent never misses an opportunity to exploit a
positive net gain.
4.2 Individual expected net gains
Defining net gain from revisions
To put it more formally, suppose that an agent receives a revision opportunity and draws available
strategy set A′a and switching cost q from their distributions PAa and Q. If the agent chooses to
switch an action, the agent should choose the best available strategy in A′a; the net gain of switch-
ing is pi∗[A′a]− pia − q. If this is positive, the agent chooses to switch strategy; if it is negative, the
agent does not switch.
Upon the revision opportunity but before the realization of A′a and q, the expected (first-order
net) gain for an action-a player is represented by23
ga∗[pi] := ∑
A′a⊂A\{a}
PAa(A′a)EQ[pi∗[A′a]− pia − q]+. (8)
Here PAa(A′a) is the probability to draw an available strategy set A′a from distribution PAa, given
the current strategy a. The expected value of the net gain is counted if and only the net gain
pi∗[A′a]−pia− q is positive. Let g∗[pi] = (ga∗[pi])a∈A be the vector that collects the expected gains
of all the actions.
23EQ is the expected value operator: EQ f (q) =
∫
R
f (q)dPQ(q) for integrable function f : R→ R.
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It may be immediate from the definition (8) to see that the expected first-order gain cannot
be negative. Besides, the expected gain becomes zero if and only if the current action a yields the
greatest payoff among all the actions given the current payoff vectorpi. Furthermore, whenever an
agent switches from one action to another, the expected gain cannot increase after the switch. If the
new action yields a strictly greater payoff than the old, the expected gain needs to strictly decrease.
In particular, any of the best available strategies b ∈ b∗[pi; A′a] yields the smallest first-order net
gain among all the available strategies. This is guaranteed by Assumption A2.24 Finally, when
the payoff vector changes from pi by ∆pi, the resulting change in ga∗[pi] is linearly approximated
by the product of ∆pi and za ∈ Va[pi], the expected transition from action a. See Lemma 1 in
Appendix C.1.
The second-order net gains
As a candidate for the decaying rate function, we define the individual expected second-order
net gain for an action-a player as
ha∗[pi] := ∑
A′a⊂A\{a}
PAa(A′a)Q(pi∗[A′a]− pia)(g∗∗[pi; A′a]− ga∗[pi]), (9)
where g∗∗[pi; A′a] = minb∈A′a gb∗[pi]. Here, the term PAa(A′a)Q(pi∗[A′a] − pia) is the probability
that, upon the receipt of the first revision opportunity, the agent receives available action set A′a
and chooses to switch from the current action a to any of the best available actions. Then, this
switch of an action changes the first-order net gain from ga∗[pi] to g∗∗[pi; A′a], which is the ex-
pected gain at the new action. Let h∗[pi] = (ha∗[pi])a∈A.
The average of the expected gains over all the switchable new actions cannot be greater than
the expected gain of switching from the current action; so the expected second-order gain cannot
be positive. Further, if the current action is not optimal, then there must be a better action and
thus the average of the new expected gains must decrease after the switch; the second-order gain
must be negative. See Lemma 2 in Appendix C.1.
4.3 Aggregate net gain and its properties
To analyze the overall social dynamic, we aggregate the expected first-order and second-order
gains over the whole population. We define the aggregate first/second-order gain functions G, H :
∆A → R as
G(x)[pi] = x · g∗[pi] and H(x)[pi] = x · h∗[pi].
Thanks to Assumption A3, ga∗[pi] is invariant under transition of x, unless it accompanies
with changes in payoffs pi. Thus, G(x)[pi] is linear in x. In particular, the change in the aggregate
gain G(x)[pi] by transition of x is simply the sum of changes in individual agents’ first-order gains
24If Assumption A2 does not hold, it may be possible that a further better action is more likely to be available after
the switch; then, the expected gain at the new action can be still greater than that at the previous action.
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ga∗[pi] to g∗∗[pi; A′a] over all revising agents. It is exactly the sum of the second-order gains and
thus coincides with H(x)[pi].
Theorem 4. Consider a regular rationalizable dynamic V . Then, the aggregate expected gain function
G : X ×RA → R and the aggregate expected second-order gain function H : X ×RA → RA satisfy the
following properties.
G i) G(x)[pi] ≥ 0 for any x ∈ ∆A,pi ∈ RA; and, ii) G(x)[pi] = 0 if and only if x ∈ ∆A(b∗[pi]).
H i) H(x)[pi] ≤ 0 for any x ∈ ∆A,pi ∈ RA; and, ii) H(x)[pi] = 0 if and only if x ∈ ∆A(b∗[pi]).
GH Further assume A3. For any x ∈ ∆A,pi ∈ RA, we have
i)
∂G
∂x
(x)[pi]∆x = H(x)[pi] ii)
∂G
∂pi
(x)[pi]∆pi = ∆x ·∆pi for any ∆x ∈ V(x)[pi],∆pi ∈ RA.
Part i) of properties G and H confirms that the aggregate net gain G is always non-negative
and the aggregate second-order net gain H is always non-positive. Part ii) states that they are both
zero if and only if (almost) all agents are taking the optimal strategies given the current payoff
vector. In property GH, part i) comes from the linearity of G in x and the defining nature of the
second-order gain, as mentioned above. Part ii) is obtained by gathering the linear approximation
of changes in ga∗[pi] caused by ∆pi.
Thanks to properties GH-i) and ii), a regular rationalizable dynamic satisfies δ-passivity (Defi-
nition 4) with function G as the pre-Lyapunov function and H as the pre-decaying rate function:
∂G
∂x
(x)[pi]∆x +
∂G
∂pi
(x)[pi]∆pi = H(x)[pi] + ∆x · ∆pi for any ∆x ∈ V(x)[pi],∆pi ∈ RA.
Corollary 3. Any regular rationalizable dynamic is δ-passive.
As we argued, δ-passivity is a mathematical base to establish equilibrium stability of con-
tractive games, which further leads to stability of a regular ESS. By generalizing the contraction
property of a (static) game F : x 7→ pi to δ-anti-passivity of a dynamic payoff generating sys-
tem {xt}t∈R+ 7→ {pi}t∈R+ , Fox and Shamma (2013) extend equilibrium stability to a setting with
various dynamic modifications of payoffs in a contractive game.25
The corollary below is immediately verified from Theorem 1 and properties G and H in The-
orem 4. It states that G and H are zero if and only if the dynamic arrives exactly at a stationary
state.
25One is smoothed payoff modification: a revising agent’s decision is based on an exponentially weighted moving
average of past payoffs. Another is anticipatory payoff modification: the population shares a predictor function pie
of near-future payoffs such as p˙ie = λ(F(x) − pie) and a revising agent responds to the perceived payoff such as
F(xt) + kp˙iet with some weight t. Fox and Shamma also consider contrarian effects: agents are less favor of actions that
increase the mass of players just recently, i.e., compared to some certain time before, say a unit of time before, and thus
they respond to F(xt)−Λ(xt − xt−l).
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Corollary 4. Suppose that functions G, H satisfy properties G and H. Then, the followings are equivalent
to each other: i) G(x)[pi] = 0, ii) H(x)[pi] = 0, iii) x ∈ ∆A(b∗(pi)), iv) V(x)[pi] = {0}.
5 Dynamic stability in contractive games and of a regular ESS
Now we integrate a population game F into an evolutionary dynamic V in order to examine
equilibrium stability in the induced game dynamic VF. Let GF(x) = G(x, F(x)) and HF(x) =
H(x, F(x)). Then, by the chain rule and then by property GH, we have
d
dt
GF(xt) ≡ ∂G
∂x
(xt, F(xt))x˙t +
∂G
∂pi
(xt, F(xt))
dF
dx
(xt)x˙t (10)
= x˙t · dFdx (xt)x˙t + H
F(xt)
for any x˙t ∈ VF(xt) and at any xt ∈ X . With properties G and H, this implies that, if the first
term cannot be positive around an equilibrium (or an equilibrium set), then the equilibrium (set)
is asymptotically stable. We find that it holds globally if the game F is contractive; with quite
another least demanding property of a rationalizable dynamic, this further leads to local stability
of a regular ESS.
5.1 Nash stability of contractive games
If F is a contractive game, the negative semidefiniteness of DF on TX implies
d
dt
GF(xt) ≤ HF(xt) for any x˙t ∈ VF(xt) and at any xt ∈ X .
With other properties of G and H, this implies global asymptotic stability of NE(F) in a contractive
game.
Theorem 5. Consider a contractive game with continuously differentiable payoff function F. If an evolu-
tionary dynamic V generates the total expected first/second-order gain functions G, H satisfying properties
G, H, and GH in Theorem 7, then NE(F) is globally asymptotically stable under the induced game dynamic
VF.
Proof of Theorem 5. We use function G as the Lyapunov function W in Theorem 2 and function H
as the decay rate function W˜. Properties G-i and H-i guarantee condition (i) in the theorem. By
properties G-ii and H-ii, condition (ii) is satisfied with the stable set being X∗ = NE(F). We have
verified (7) without making restriction on the initial state x0; so it holds globally and thus the basin
of attraction is X′ = X .
Corollary 5. In a contractive game with a continuously differentiable payoff function, the set of Nash
equilibria is globally asymptotically stable under any regular rationalizable dynamic.
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(a) Trajectory under Smith (b) Net and aggregate gains under Smith
Figure 1: Convergence to the unique Nash equilibrium in a good RPS and changes in the aggregate
gross and net gains under a pairwise comparison dynamic (Smith). In Figure 1b, the aggregate
net gain G is shown with a black thick curve and the aggregate gross gain Γ with a red thin curve.
The next example shows that the gross gain cannot serve as a Lyapunov function, even in in a
strictly contractive game.
Example 4 (Rock-Paper-Scissors). Here we consider random matching in a good Rock-Paper-Scissors
game, where a player gets payoff of 1 from a win, 0 from a draw and −0.9 from a loss. This game
is strictly contractive and thus the unique Nash equilibrium x = (xR, xP, xS) = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3)
is globally asymptotically stable under rationalizable dynamics. In Figure 1a, the Smith dynamic
starts from x = (0.9, 0.05, 0.05) and indeed converges to (1/3, 1/3, 1/3). In Figure 1b, the aggre-
gate net gain G decreases over time while the aggregate gross gain Γ has a decreasing trend but
with perpetual fluctuations.
5.2 Local stability of a regular ESS
Recall that random matching in a normal-form game with an interior ESS is a contractive game.
Therefore, the above theorem guarantees global asymptotic stability of an interior ESS in a linear
game. Without assuming linearity, now suppose that an intrernal state x∗ ∈ ∆A++ := {x ∈ ∆A |
xa > 0 ∀a ∈ A} is the only Nash equilibrium in some neighborhood of itself and DF(x) is negative
semidefinite at any state x in this neighborhood; or, as a stronger but more concise condition, we
can assume negative definiteness of DF(x∗). Then, it is immediate from the above argument to
obtain asymptotic stability of x∗ by the Lyapunov stability theorem. Actually, these assumptions
imply that x∗ is an interior ESS in this (possibly, non-linear) population game F. Thus, we can say
that local stability of an interior ESS can be established by imposing a bit stronger condition on
DF. Below we extend this idea to an ESS on the boundary of X .
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As Sandholm (2010a) shows, Nash stability of contractive games is a stepping stone to obtain
local stability of evolutionary stable states: the Lyapunov function for a (regular) ESS is obtained
by adding one extra term to the one for a contractive game. In the idea presented by Sandholm,
the additional term counts the mass of agents who play the actions that are not taken by any
positive mass at the ESS. This idea works widely over major evolutionary dynamics, though it
was proven only for each of them: Cressman (1997) for imitative dynamics; Sandholm (2010a) for
pairwise comparison dynamics, excess payoff dynamics, and the standard BRD; Zusai (2018b) for
tempered BRDs.26 Here we verify the stability of a regular ESS in a general setting.
In part ii) of Definition 3, the negative definiteness condition suggests that the payoff vector
field is strictly contractive around a regular ESS, if the action set is restricted to S := {s ∈ A | x∗s >
0}, the set of actions used at x∗. With this restriction, the aggregate gain function should decrease
strictly and approach to zero over time. However, as agents could take actions in U := A \ S, the
quadratic term x˙ · DF(x∗)x˙ may not be negative if x˙ ∈ RAS0 and thus the aggregate gain might not
decrease over time.
However, quasi-strictness of the equilibrium in part i) implies that action in U remain worse
than those in S if the current state x is not too far from x∗, i.e., it is in some neighborhood of
x∗. As long as agents never switch to worse actions, the mass of players of these actions should
not increase but only decrease. When these actions are completely extinguished, i.e., the state x
reaches ∆A(S) := {x ∈ ∆A | xu = 0 ∀u /∈ S}, then the transition vector x˙ ∈ VF(x) should assign
zero transition x˙u = 0 to all the actions u ∈ U; thus, the local contractiveness of DF(x) in the
restricted action set pushes the state toward the locally unique equilibrium x∗.
From this observation, Sandholm (2010a) proposes to construct a Lyapunov function for a
regular ESS by adding two functions that monotonically decrease in the respectively restricted
subdomains. One is the gain function GF, which decreases on ∆A(S) until the dynamic reaches
x∗; this is accompanied by HF as a decaying function. Another is (a multiple of) the total mass of
players who take actions in U, i.e., xU := ∑u∈U xu, which decreases as long as x is in the neighbor-
hood X∗. About the decaying function for xU , Sandholm (2001) presents different functions for
different major dynamics.
Below we first present general conditions on these functions for asymptotic stability of a regu-
lar ESS; they are satisfied by those major dynamics considered in Sandholm (2010a).27 We obtain
a general form of the decaying rate function for xU . First, Assumption A1 guarantees that, from
any action in U, some actions in S are available with a positive probability: let P¯S be the minimum
of such probabilities. Besides, quasi-strictness at pi∗ := F(x∗) implies that we can make a lower
bound on the payoff advantages of S to U. Since Q is a nondecreasing function function, this
assures a lower bound on the switching rates from U, say Q¯. Combining these, we get a lower
bound on the decreasing rate of xU .
Property MN implies that the decaying function for xU dominates possible increase in G due
26See also Sawa and Zusai (2016) for the BRD in multitasking setting.
27Note that the assumptions in Theorem 6 are conditioned on the gain functions.
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to failure of negative definiteness of DF out of ∆A(S); thus it assures the the combined Lyapunov
function to monotonically decrease even out of ∆A(S). Then we confirm that it is applied to
a rationalizable dynamic, including newly proposed dynamics such as BRD with a randomly
restricted action set.
Theorem 6. Suppose that, given (x0,pi0) ∈ ∆A×RA such that pi0s > pi0u and x0s > 0 = x0u for any s ∈ S
and u ∈ U := A \ S, evolutionary dynamic V has
a) a pair of Lipschitz continuous function G and continuous function H satisfying properties G, H, and
GH-0,1 in Theorem 7;
b) another pair of continuous functions MU , NU : RA × ∆A → R that satisfies the following properties:
there exists a neighborhood X0 ×Π0 of (x0,pi0) and a constant C > 0 such that, at any point (x,pi) ∈
Π0 × X0 and any ∆x ∈ V[pi](x),
M i) ∑u∈U ∆xu ≤ −MU [pi](x) ≤ 0; ii) MU [pi](x) = 0 ⇔ xU = 0.
N ∑u∈U |∆xu| ≤ NU [pi](x).
MN CMU [pi](x) ≥ NU [pi](x).
Consider a game F with a regular ESS x∗; let S and U be those associated with x∗ as in Definition 3. In
addition, assume that the dynamic is bounded in the sense that there exists d¯ > 0 such that |x˙| < d¯ for any
x˙ ∈ VF(x) at any x ∈ X . Then, x∗ is (locally) asymptotically stable.
Corollary 6. A regular ESS is asymptotically stable under any regular rationalizable dynamic. Functions
MU and NU are defined as
MU [pi](x) := Q¯MP¯SxU , NU [pi](x) := 2Q¯NxU ,
with some Q¯M, Q¯N > 0 depending on Q and pi0 and some P¯S > 0 depending on PA· and partition S, U.
As a technical caveat on the above intuition, we should note that the set of states where ac-
tions in U are strictly worse than those in S may not be forward invariant even in a rationalizable
dynamic. That is, a dynamic may escape from such a subspace, as decreasing xU may not help
to maintain or reinforce the payoff advantages of S against U; so this subspace may not serve as
a basin of attraction to ∆A(S) or to x∗. This lack of forward invariance prevents us from simply
using the theorem on transitivity of asymptotic stability (Oyama, Sandholm, and Tercieux, 2015,
Theorem 3; Conley, 1978, §II.5.3.D). In Appendix D.1, we start the proof of Theorem 6 from pre-
senting a general theorem to allow such a loose pseudo-transitivity argument; there, we shrink
the subspace to a smaller invariant set with the help of the combined Lyapunov function and then
this smaller set is verified to work as a basin of attraction to x∗.
Remark. Friedman (1991) defines order compatibility of a game dynamic VF as a property such as
i) x˙a > x˙b ⇔ Fa(x) > Fb(x) whenever xa, xb > 0 and ii) x˙u = 0 whenever xu = 0. Note that
the set of order compatible transition vectors x˙ from a given state x constitutes a convex cone. In
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Counterexample 2, Friedman suggests that some order compatible dynamics diverge away from
a unique interior regular ESS in a linear game, which is indeed a strictly contractive game.
The comparison between his general study and ours clarifies the source of this difference in
in-/stability of ESS. We share the idea that economic dynamics should agree with incentives. In
our framework, it is reflected in the construction of revision protocols in which revision rate Q(p˘i)
is a non-decreasing function of p˘i, the payoff improvement by revision. In particular, if all the
actions are always available, i.e., PAa[A \ {a}] ≡ 1, and Q is strictly increasing, then an agent
who is taking a worse action is more likely to abandon it than one taking a better action. So a
similar order compatibility—or payoff monotonicity—is met at individual level. On the other
hand, the order compatibility imposes payoff monotonicity on the aggregate net flow x˙ in the
entire population.28
Because of this difference, an order compatible dynamic may not fit into our framework. It is
indeed the case for the dynamics that work to negate convergence to a regular ESS in Friedman’s
example. On the other hand, since we allow restriction to the available action set, our dynamic
may fail order compatibility. We discuss these points in Appendix D.1.
Friedman (1991, p.638) distinguishes economic dynamics from the biological evolution rep-
resented by a replicator dynamic by arguing ”A wide variety of learning and imitation pro-
cesses are conceivable and the appropriate dynamical representation seems to be highly context-
dependent.” Our attempt here is to capture various payoff-dependent dynamics into a single
framework while allowing deviation from exact optimization by introducing restriction to ac-
tion sets and switching costs; “economic” consistency in our framework simply means (possibly,
constrained) rationality, i.e., consistency with optimal behavior, just as conventional economists
would think of. It would be interesting to search for an agent-level revision protocol that aggre-
gates to an order compatible dynamic but is not captured in our framework.29
6 Applying the framework to major dynamics
Our construction of the gain function G and H is consistent with the known Lyapunov function
of major dynamics: see Figure 2.
6.1 Excess payoff dynamics and perturbed BRD
Excess payoff dynamics and perturbed best response dynamics need a little modification of our
base model. In the former, an agent’s switching rate to a new action is an increasing function of
excess payoff, i.e., the relative payoff of an action compared with the average payoff in the population.
To obtain it as the probability that the payoff from the optimal action exceeds the one from the
28About imposing a condition directly on x˙, Friedman’s order compatibility can be more naturally fit with a payoff-
dependent revision protocol if the dynamic is interpreted as evolution of a mixed strategy, where players choose mixed
strategies.
29Obviously we exclude observational dynamics such as imitative dynamics. However, it would also fail to meet
order compability because it does not condition on xa of each action as the likelihood to observe action-a players.
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Rationalizable dynamics in the base framework (this paper)
PAa: Assumptions A1,A2; Q: Assumption Q1.
• V(x)[pi] = ∑
a∈A
xa ∑
A′a⊂A\{a}
PAa(A′a)Q(pi∗[A′a]− pia)(∆A(b∗[pi; A′a])− ea).
• G(x)[pi] = ∑
a∈A
xa ∑
A′a⊂A\{a}
PAa(A′a)EQ[pi∗[A′a]− pia − q]+.
• H(x)[pi] = ∑
a∈A
xa ∑
A′a⊂A\{a}
PAa(A′a)Q(pi∗[A′a]− pia)(g∗∗[pi; A′a]− ga∗[pi]).
Tempered BRDs (Zusai, 2018b)
PAa[A \ {a}] = 1; Q: any function that meets Assumption Q1.
• V(x)[pi] = ∑
a∈A
xaQ(pi∗ − pia)(∆A(b∗[pi])− ea).
• G(x)[pi] = ∑
a∈A
xaEQ[pi∗ − pia − q]+.
• H(x)[pi] = − ∑
a∈A
xaQ(pi∗ − pia)EQ[pi∗ − pia − q]+.
Standard BRD (Hofbauer, 1995)
PAa[A \ {a}] = 1; Q(q) = 1 for any q > 0.
• V(x)[pi] = ∆A(b∗[pi])− x.
• G(x)[pi] = pi∗ − x ·pi = ∑
a∈A
xa[pi∗ − pia]+.
• H(x)[pi] = − ∑
a∈A
xa[pi∗ − pia]+ = −G(x)[pi].
Figure 2: Major dynamics captured under the base framework. A box containing another box
suggests that the class of dynamics represented in a larger box includes the dynamics in a smaller
box. The parts in red are Va(x[pi]), ga∗(x[pi]) and ha∗(x[pi]). To match G with the formula of
the Lyapunov functions in the literature, note that EQ[q¯]+ =
∫ q¯
0 Q(q)dq if Q(0) = 0 and PQ is
continuous overR. The reference on each dynamic is a paper that presents the Lyapunov function
for the dynamic. Hofbauer (1995, 2001) initially proposed those Lyapunov functions for a game
with an interior ESS.
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Rationalizable dynamic in the base frame, continued.
Pairwise comparison dynamics (Hofbauer and Sandholm, 2009)
PAa({b}) = 1/(A− 1) for each b 6= a; Q: any function that meets Assumption Q1.
• V(x)[pi] = ∑
a∈A
xa∑
b 6=a
Q(pib − pia)
A− 1 (eb − ea).
• G(x)[pi] = ∑
a∈A
xa∑
b 6=a
1
A− 1EQ[pib − pia − q]+.
• H(x)[pi] = ∑
a∈A
xa∑
b 6=a
Q(pib − pia)
(A− 1)2
(
∑
c 6=b
EQ[pic − pib − q]+ − ∑
c 6=a
EQ[pic − pia − q]+
)
.
Smith dynamic (Smith, 1984)
PAa({b}) = 1/(A− 1) for each b 6= a; Q(q) = [q]+.
• V(x)[pi] = ∑
a∈A
xa∑
b 6=a
[pib − pia]+
A− 1 (eb − ea).
• G(x)[pi] = ∑
a∈A
xa∑
b 6=a
1
2(A− 1) [pib − pia]
2.
• H(x)[pi] = ∑
a∈A
xa∑
b 6=a
[pib − pia]+
(A− 1)2
(
∑
c 6=b
[pic − pib]2+
2
− ∑
c 6=a
[pic − pia]2+
2
)
.
Figure 2: (Continued)
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Birth-death rationalizable dynamics (modified framework in Appendix E.1)
PA: Assumption A1’; Q: Assumption Q1.
• V(x)[pi] = ∑
A′⊂A
PA(A′)Q(pˆi∗[A′])
(
∆A(b∗[pi; A′]− x
)
.
• G(x)[pi] = ∑
A′⊂A
PA(A′)EQ[pˆi∗[A′]− q]+.
• H(x)[pi] = −
{
∑
A′⊂A
PA(A′)Q(pˆi∗[A′])
}{
∑
A′⊂A
PA(A′)Q(pˆi∗[A′])pˆi∗[A′]
}
.
Excess payoff dynamics (Hofbauer and Sandholm, 2009)
PA({b}) = 1/A for each b 6= a; Q: any function that meets Assumption Q1.
• V(x)[pi] = ∑
b∈A
Q(pˆib)
A
(eb − x).
• G(x)[pi] = ∑
b∈A
1
A
EQ[pˆib − q]+.
• H(x)[pi] = −
{
∑
b∈A
Q(pˆib)
A
}{
∑
b∈A
Q(pˆib)
A
pˆib
}
.
Brown-von Neuman-Nash dynamic (Hofbauer, 2001)
PA({b}) = 1/A for each b 6= a; Q(q) = [q]+.
• V(x)[pi] = ∑
b∈A
[pˆib]+
A
(eb − x).
• G(x)[pi] = ∑
b∈A
1
2A
[pˆib − q]2+.
• H(x)[pi] = −
{
∑
b∈A
[pˆib]+
A
}{
∑
b∈A
[pˆib]+
A
pˆib
}
.
Figure 3: Major dynamics captured under the modified framework. Zusai (2018a) presents a
further modified framework, in which a player chooses a mixed strategy, to cover perturbed best
response dynamics.
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status quo plus the switching cost, the population average strategy, i.e., x, should be regarded
as the mixed-strategy status quo: if an agent chooses the status quo to avoid the payment of
switching costs, the new action is chosen randomly according to the current action distribution
x ∈ ∆A in the population. This can be interpreted as a large-population evolutionary dynamic
with the birth and death process (Alo´s-Ferrer and Neustadt, 2010). See Appendix E.1.
The perturbed BRDs needs rationalization of perturbation from the exact best response. Ac-
cording to Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002), there are two approaches. First, each agent is con-
sidered as facing idiosyncratic payoff perturbation though the agent chooses the exact optimal
choice given the perturbed payoffs. The perturbed BRD emerges as the aggregation of such het-
erogeneous exact BRD. A heterogeneous dynamic is covered later in this paper as an extension of
the base model to games in finitely many distinctive populations. Such extension in this paper is
limited to finitely many types of heterogeneous agents and thus does not cover the logit dynamic,
for example.
In the second approach, an agent chooses a mixed strategy y ∈ ∆A and there is a control
cost V(y) to prevent the agent from taking a pure strategy. The control cost perturbs the agent’s
optimal strategy. This is studied in Zusai (2018a), which applies the idea of the gain to such
mixed-strategy evolutionary dynamics. Excess payoff target dynamics can be also covered in the
mixed-strategy framework by assuming zero control costs. The paper allows agents to face the
control cost (to cover pBRDs), switching costs (to cover excess payoff dynamics) and stochastic
restricted action sets.
6.2 (Only) Lyapunov stability in imitative dynamics
Assumption A3 prevents us from including observational dynamics into our framework: for ex-
ample, we could define the probability that action b is availablePAa(b ∈ A′a) for imitative dynamic
by the probability that a b-player is sampled from the society and then we could define the indi-
vidual gain function g as in (8) and then the aggregate G. But the essence of such observational
dynamics is that the sampling probability depends on the current actual distribution of actions in
the society. Then, Assumption A3 does not hol, which invalidates property GH.
For example, consider the replicator dynamic; it could be fit in our framework by having
PAa[{b}] = xb. If we dare to apply our definition of the aggregate gain function, we obtain
G(x)[pi] = ∑
a∈A
xa ∑
b∈A
xbEQ[pib − pia − q]+.
We can readily find that the time derivative of this aggregate gain function is
G˙(x)[pi] = p˙i · ∂G
∂pi
(x)[pi] + x˙ · ∂G
∂x
(x)[pi]
= x˙ · p˙i + H(x)[pi] + ∑
a∈A
xa ∑
b∈A
x˙bEQ[pib − pia − q]+.
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(a) Trajectory under the replicator dynamic (b) Net and aggregate gains under the replicator dynamic
Figure 4: Convergence to the unique Nash equilibrium in a good RPS and changes in the aggregate
gross and net gains under the replicator dynamic. In Example 4, the known Lyapunov function
Wx∗(x) is shown with a blue dotted curve, the aggregate net gain G with a black thick solid curve
and the aggregate gross gain with a red thin solid curve.
The last term represents the effects of changes in x through changes in the sampling probability
PAa[{b}] = xb and thus obtained peculiarly for observational dynamics.30 Due to this term, G˙
may not be negative and G may not monotonically decrease over time even in a contractive game.
Example 4 (continuing from p. 22). Again, we consider random matching in the good Rock-Paper-
Scissors. Since it is a strictly contractive game, the unique Nash equilibrium x∗ = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3)
is globally asymptotically stable under replicator and projection dynamics as well as rationalizable
dynamics. Example 4 illustrates the evolution under the replicator dynamic. Both the aggregate
gross gain G and the aggregate gross gain Γ fluctuates constantly. According to Taylor and Jonker
(1978), function Wx∗(x) = ∑a∈A(1/3)(ln x∗a − ln xa) works as a Lyapunov function. Actually it
decreases over time; the trajectory converges from (0.9, 0.05, 0.05) to x∗.
For major imitative dynamics such as the replicator and projection dynamics, only Lyapunov
stability is obtained for contractive games in general. For asymptotic stability, strict contraction is
needed. Mertikopoulos and Sandholm (2017) provide a general form of the Lyapunov function
for Nash stability of a strictly contractive game and local stability of an ESS under “Riemannian”
game dynamics, including these two dynamics as canonical examples.31 Lahkar and Sandholm
30Notice that x˙b may be positive or negative, depending on the share of b players (and thus the likelihood of having
them sampled) and the relative payoff of b. If b performs better than other strategies and also has got a large share of
players, this additional term should be positive while the other terms are negative.
31See their paper for the general form. For the replicator dynamic , it reduces to Wx∗ (x) = ∑a∈S(x∗) x∗a ln(x∗a /xa), as
in Hofbauer, Schuster, and Sigmund (1979); Zeeman (1980). Here S(x∗) ⊂ A is the set of actions used in x∗. Notice that
these Lyapunov functions for these dynamics require an a priori specification of the limit state x∗, since the Lyapuno
functions basically measures the (Riemannian) geometric distance from x∗.
30
(2008) and Sandholm, Dokumacı, and Lahkar (2008) further explore this issue.
7 Extension: heterogeneity and aggregate games
7.1 Multi-population games
The model and all the propositions can be easily extended to a multi-population game in which
different populations may have different payoff functions and/or different revision protocols, as
long as each population’s revision protocol satisfies the assumptions.
To make this concrete, we need to introduce a little more notation. Now we consider a game
played by several populations P = {1, . . . , P}. The society consists of a unit mass of the agents,
who belong to either one of these P populations; let mp > 0 be the mass of population p ∈ P and
∑p∈P mp = 1. In each population p ∈ P , all the agents have the same action setAp = {1, . . . , Ap};
X p := mp∆Ap is the set of feasible population states. The social state xP = (xp)p∈P ∈ RAP is a
collection of each population’s state. Here, AP = ∑p∈P Ap. Denote by X P :=
Ś
p∈P X p the set of
all the feasible social states.
Agents in the same population evaluates the social state based on the same payoff function
Fp : X P → RAp . So Fp(xP ) is the payoff vector for agents in population p ∈ P when the social
state is xP . We denote by piP the collection of payoff vectors pip ∈ RAp over all the populations
p ∈ P , i.e., piP = (pip)p∈P ∈ RAP .32 The definition of a contractive game is extended to a multi-
population setting by requiring F, x, y in condition (2) to be replaced with FP , xP , yP . With similar
replacement, the equivalent first-order condition (3) is extended to a multi-population contractive
game; the extension of a regular ESS is called a Taylor regular ESS.
We construct the dynamic of xP as
x˙P = (x˙p)p∈P ∈ VP (xP )[piP ] :=
ą
p∈P
V p(xp)[pip],
where x˙p ∈ V p(xp)[pip] is the transition of population p’s state xp when the population’s current
state is xp and the payoff vector for the population is pip.
We allow different populations to follow different revision protocols, as long as each proto-
col can be represented by constrained optimization with (possibly) stochastic available set and
switching cost. Let PpQ and P
p
A be the distributions of available sets and of switching costs for
population p. As in the single-population base model, we define the expected first and second-
order gain functions gp∗, hp∗ : RA
p → RAp for population p as functions of the population’s own
payoff vector pip ∈ RAp . Similarly, we denote by Gp, HP : X p ×RAp → R as these aggregates in
each population:
Gp(xp)[pip] = xp · gp∗(pip) and Hp(xp)[pip] = xp · hp∗(pip).
32Both xP and piP are AP -dimensional column vectors.
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Notice that all these four functions are defined from each population’s protocol PpQ,P
p
A and eval-
uated from the population state and its payoff vector xp,pip. Thus, as long as each population’s
protocol satisfies the needed assumptions as specified in the base model, Lemmas 1 and 2 and the-
orem 4 guarantee that these four functions for the population satisfy all the properties g, h, G, H,
GH in these theorems.
Now, to investigate stability in the extended multi-population game on X P , we further take
the sum of all the aggregate gains: define the total aggregate first and second order gain functions
GP , HP : X P ×RAP → R by
GP (xP )[piP ] := ∑
p∈P
Gp(xp)[pip], and HP (xP )[piP ] := ∑
p∈P
Hp(xp)[pip].
Theorem 7. Suppose that, for each population p ∈ P , the aggregate first and second order gain functions
Gp, HP : ∆Ap ×RAp → R satisfy the properties G, H, and GH as in Theorem 4. Then, the total of them
GP and HP also satisfy properties G, H, and GH.33
To extend local stability of a regular ESS, consider x0p ∈ X P and pi0p ∈ RAP for each popula-
tion p such that pi0psp > pi
0p
up and x
0p
sp > 0 = x
0p
up for any s
p ∈ Sp and up ∈ Up := Ap \ Sp; assume
that functions MpUp and N
p
Up satisfy properties M, N and MN in some neighborhood X
0p ×Π0p
of (x0p,pi0p) under population-p’s evolutionary dynamic V p. Then, with Π0P := Śp∈P Π0p and
X0P :=
Ś
p∈P X0p as neighborhoods of x0P = (x0p)p∈P and pi0P = (pi0p)p∈P , we can readily
construct functions MPU , N
P
U : X
0P ×Π0P → R as
MPU := ∑
p∈P
MpUp(x
p)[pip], and NPU := ∑
p∈P
NpUp(x
p)[pip].
Theorem 8. Suppose that, for each population p ∈ P , functions MpUp , NpUp : X0p ×Π0p → R satisfy
properties M,N and MN in X0p ×Π0p, as in Theorem 6. Then, the total of them MPU , NPU also satisfy the
properties M, N and MN in X0P ×Π0P .
Corollary 7. Consider a multi-population game with each population’s dynamic satisfying the above as-
sumptions for Theorem 7. Then, the following stability results hold.
i) If FP is a contractive game, NE(F) is globally asymptotically stable.
ii) If xP∗ is an isolated interior Nash equilibrium in population game FP and DFP (xP ) is negative
semidefinite for any xP in a neighborhood of xP∗, then xP∗ is asymptotically stable.
iii) Furthermore, assume that an evolution dynamic of each population also has functions Mp and Np that
satisfy properties M, N, and MN. Then, a (Taylor) regular ESS is asymptotically stable.
Choices in different populations affect evolution in other populations thorugh playing a game
33The set of mixed strategies over optimal actions ∆A(b∗[pi]) should be redefined asŚp∈P ∆Ap (b∗[pip])
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FP on the same field.34 However, the separation of an evolutionary dynamic VP (xP )[piP ] from a
game piP = FP (xP ) allows us to put aside this indirect interdependence between different pop-
ulations. Thus, the properties of gains and the resulting stability theorems are straightforwardly
extended from each population’s dynamic to the overall multi-population dynamic.
While it may not be obvious how the Lyapunov functions LF in Table Figure 2 can be extended
or merged in the multi-population setting, now we know that this separating allows us first to
simply add up the gain functions and then embed FP ; so we can postpone taking into account the
over-population interdependence in FP until we obtain the multi-population gain functions GP
and HP .
Even if a dynamic cannot be fit into our framework of optimization-based revision protocols,
we can apply this theorem to the dynamic as long as we can somehow find functions G and H that
satisfy these properties for this dynamic. We have seen excess payoff target dynamics for such an
example. That is, we can include any dynamics in Figure 2 into this multi-population evolutionary
dynamic for the above theorem.
Note that, in the construction of the gain functions GP and HP , each population’s gain Gp and
Hp are assumed to depend only on xp and pip. For non-observational dynamics, it only requires
uncoupledness—independence of the dynamic from pi−p. However, for observational dynamics,
it requires an agent’s observations of others’ choices to be limited to the same population.
The extension to the multi-population setting covers some interesting class of games.
Example 5 (A saddle game). It has been long to call game theorists’ attention to a multi-player
game with a saddle function φ : X P → R.35 The population set is partitioned to two distinct,
nonempty subsets PC and PV such that P = PC ∪ PV and PC ∩ PV 6= ∅. In a large-population
interpretation, we define the game as a population game where population p’s payoff function is
given by
Fp(xP ) :=

∂φ
∂xc (x
P ) if p = c ∈ PC,
− ∂φ∂xv (xP ) if p = v ∈ PV .
To call φ a saddle function, φ is concave in xC = (xp)p∈PC and convex in xV = (xp)p∈PV ; assuming
second-order continuous differentiability of φ, it implies ∂
2φ
∂(xC)2 (x
P ) ≡ ∂FC
∂xC (x
P ) is negative semidef-
inite and ∂
2φ
∂(xV)2 (x
P ) ≡ − ∂FV
∂xV (x
P ) is positive semidefinite at any xP ; hence, dFVdxV (x
P ) is negative
definite. By Young’s theorem, we have ∂
2φ
∂xq∂xp ≡ ∂
2φ
∂xp∂xq and thus
∂FV
∂xC +
∂FC
∂xV ≡
∂2φ
∂xC∂xV −
∂2φ
∂xV∂xC ≡ 0.
From these assumptions, we can say that, when a population in PC take the best response Bp(xP ),
34Note that, because of this, even an uncoupled nonobservational dynamic cannot guarantee convergence to Nash
equilibria in general (Hart and Mas-Colell, 2003).
35Classical stability results in Kose (1956) can be interpreted as showing asymptotic stability of the unique Nash
equilibrium under excess payoff dynamics in a game with a strict saddle function. Interestingly, Kose considers an ap-
plication to numerical solution of a saddle value problem and proposes an electro-analog computer for the calculation.
Nora and Uno (2014) relate correlated equilibria in a saddle game to robust equilibria under incomplete information.
Sorin and Hofbauer (2005) verifies Nash stability in this class of games under the standard BRD. Although they re-
gard this game as a zero-sum game, it is slightly broader than zero-sum games; see an example of private provision of
defense services from attack in Nora and Uno (2014, Example 1).
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it maximizes the saddle function φ given the current xP ; one in PV minimizes φ in the best re-
sponse.
FP is a contractive game, since
zP · dF
P
dxP
(xP )zP = ∑
p,q∈P
zp · ∂F
p
∂xq
(xP )zq = zC · ∂F
C
∂xC
(xP )zC + zV · ∂F
V
∂xV
(xP )zV ≤ 0
by negative definiteness of ∂F
C
∂xC (x
P ) and ∂FV
∂xV (x
P ) and the aforementioned Young’s theorem. Thus,
we can apply Corollary 7 to guarantee convergence to Nash equilibria under general rationalizable
dynamics.
7.2 Unobservable heterogeneity in protocols or payoffs
Even though the extension was straightforward, it has a few particularly interesting implica-
tions. Although different populations are distinguished differently in the above presentation of
the model, they need not to be.
More specifically, here we restrict games to aggregate games with additively separable payoffs.
In an aggregate game, all populations share the same action set A = {1, . . . , A}, i.e., Ap = A for
all p ∈ P and each population’s payoff vector depends only on the aggregate action distribution
over the society, which is defined as the sum of x1, . . . , xP, i.e.,
x¯ := ∑
q∈P
xq ∈ ∆A,
but not on the profile of those in each population xP . We assume that payoff heterogeneity is
additively separable: each population’s payoff function Fp : X P → RA consists of common payoff
function F0 : ∆A → RA and constant payoff perturbation θp ∈ RA:
Fp(xP ) = F0(∑
q∈P
xq) + θp.
The aggregation represent unobservability of each agent’s belonging population when they play
the game. In particular, if a game is random matching of a strategic form game with payoff ma-
trix Π, the common payoff Πx¯ is indeed the expected payoff from a match randomly made in
the whole society. Note that, like in the last section, different populations may or may not have
different revision protocols.
Theorem 9. If the common payoff function F0 : ∆A → RA is a contractive game, then the extended payoff
function FP = (Fp)p∈P : X P → RAP is also a contractive game.
Corollary 8. Introduce additively separable payoff heterogeneity into a contractive game. Even if hetero-
geneity in payoff and/or revision protocol is not observable when they play the game, Nash stability of the
contractive game remains to hold.
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Sandholm (2002, 2005) proposes to extend the idea of Pigouvian tax to the evolutionary dy-
namic setting in order to achieve the maximal aggregate payoff at the limit state under negative
externality. To prove the global convergence to the social optimum, the aggregate payoff func-
tions is supposed to be concave; the Pigouvian tax makes it a potential function in a game with
tax and thus concavity of the potential function implies global convergence. Since a contractive
game is generalization of a concave potential game and removes the assumption of exact symme-
try of externalities, our result suggests robustness of global convergence to the social optimum by
Sandholm’s dynamic Pigouvian pricing scheme.
In aggregate games, we could consider a hybrid dynamic where an agent may keep the current
choice of an action as a status quo or may be replaced with a new agent. The former is considered
so far and the latter is considered in Appendix to modify our framework to include excess payoff
dynamics. The above result suggests that the equilibrium stability is retained in such a hybrid
dynamic with random replacements of agents.
8 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we propose the notion of gains from revisions in deterministic evolutionary dynam-
ics. To rigorously define it, we reconstruct a dynamic from an optimization-based revision proto-
col. A variety of evolutionary dynamics is retained by allowing stochastic restriction to available
actions and random switching costs. The aggregate net gain serves as a Lyapunov function to
prove Nash stability of contractive games; with a small modification, this further extends to local
stability of a regular ESS.
Our general approach not only provides general proofs of these fundamental stability theo-
rems with consistent and economically intuitive logic but also extends the results to the heteroge-
neous setting where different agents follow different revision protocols or their payoff functions
differ in additive separable manner.
While our analysis is confined here to a strategic-form game, the author believes that the idea
of net gains should be generally applicable to prove global stability of the equilibrium set in a
version of contractive games or local stability of a sort of an ESS. For example, Sawa and Zusai
(2016) consider the BRD in simultaneous play of multiple games (multitasking BRD); though the
multitasking BRD does not fit exactly into our framework in this paper, they can apply the idea of
the net gain to prove Nash stability of contractive games and local stability of a regular ESS.
Typically in sequential-move games or repeated games, one may define a version of an ESS that
is tailored to each specific situation in order to refine the equilibrium concept.36 The equilibrium
refinement a` la ESS may be based on a rough idea on how an agent learns plays of others in the
36For example, Fujiwara-Greve and Okuno-Fujiwara (2009, 2016) consider a repeated game in which players can
choose whether to keep the match or to seek for a new opponent; in the latter paper, they define a version of ESS for
random matching in large population that play this kind of repeated games; see also Garcia and van Veelen (2016).
Models of preference evolution also normally take the “indirect evolution approach” (Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya, 2007):
these models define a version of ESS to be suitable for the double layered co-evolution in choices of actions and prefer-
ence and adopt it as a solution concept.
35
society and adjusts its own behavior to it. One may hope to justify the ad-hoc refinement by
establishing dynamic stability. This paper suggests to formally define such a dynamic from that
rough idea and then track down the transition of the net gain from revisions under the dynamic;
a proper formulation of the dynamic and the gain concept should yield dynamic stability of the
tailor-made equilibrium concept.
36
A Appendix to Section 2
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. First of all, if a ∈ b∗[pi], then pia = pi∗ ≥ pi∗[A′a] for any A′a ⊂ A \ {a}. Thus, for any of
such A′a, Assumption Q1-i) implies Q(pi∗[A′a]−pia) = 0: no switch occurs from a. Hence, we have
a ∈ b∗[pi] =⇒ Va[pi] = {0}.
In particular, this further implies that there is no outflow from the mass of action a-players; since
zba ≥ 0 always holds in any z ∈ Vb[pi] as long as b 6= a, the assumption a ∈ b∗[pi] implies
za = xazaa + ∑
b∈A\{a}
xbzba ≥ 0
in any z ∈ V [pi]; that is, xa cannot decrease.
In contrast, consider a suboptimal action a /∈ b∗[pi]. Then, Assumption A1 implies the exis-
tence of A′a ⊂ A \ {a} such that PAa(A′a) > 0 and A′a ∩ b∗[pi] 6= ∅. Then, as pi∗ = pi∗[A′a] > pia,
Assumption Q1 implies Q(pi∗[A′a]− pia) > 0. Besides, as ya[pi; A′a] ∈ ∆A(b∗[pi; A′a]) and b∗[pi] ⊃
b∗[pi; A′a], there exists an action b ∈ b∗[pi] such that yab[pi; A′a] > 0. Hence, the switch from a to b
occurs with positive probability zab ≥ PAa(A′a)Q(pi∗[pi; A′a]− pia)yab[pi; A′a] > 0, conditional on a
being played before the revision opportunity. Notice that, as b ∈ b∗[pi], there is no outflow from b
as we argued above.
Now, assume x ∈ ∆A(b∗[pi]); if xa > 0, then a ∈ b∗[pi] and thus Va[pi] = {0} as we verified
here first. Hence, we have V(x)[pi] = ∑a xaVa[pi] = {0}.
For the converse, assume x /∈ ∆A(b∗[pi]); then there exists an suboptimal action a /∈ b∗[pi]
played by a positive mass of agents xa > 0. As we argued above, for any ya[pi; A′a] ∈ ∆A(b∗[pi; A′a])
there must be an optimal action b ∈ b∗[pi] such that zab > 0. Then, by xa > 0, we have
zb ≥ xbzbb + xazab > 0.
So 0 /∈ V(x)[pi].
B Appendix to Section 3
B.1 Proof of Theorem 2
There are a few differences from Zusai (2018b, Theorem 7) to relax assumptions slightly. First,
in the previous version, the condition i) is assumed for every point in the entire space X . By
checking the places where this definition of the domains and the condition are used in the proof
of the previous version, one can easily find that it is innocuous to replace X with a closed subset
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X∗ in a compact metric space.37 Second and subtle but more importantly, the assumption in the
previous version was a bit stronger condition than (7): every Carathe´odory solution {xt} starting
from X′ should satisfy
W˙(xt) ≤ W˜(xt) for almost all t ∈ [0,∞). (11)
If X′ is forward invariant, then (7) implies this condition; thus, Zusai (2018b) is straightforwardly
applied and we can conclude that X∗ is asymptotically stable and X′ is a basin of attraction.
In part i) of Theorem 2 in the current version, we do not require forward invariance of X′ in
part i); a solution trajectory may escape from A′ and thus (11) may not be maintained. The current
version is more convenient to establish local stability, because we do not have to track a solution
trajectory to see if (11) is maintained.
Proof. Here we prove the difference in part i) from Zusai (2018b, Theorem 7). For this, we focus
on the case of X′ ( X and find a forward invariant subset of X′. If we find it, any Carathe´odory
solution starting from the forward invariant subset remains there and thus satisfies (11) by (7) at
each x = xt. Then, Zusai (2018b, Theorem 7) is applied and assures asymptotic stability of X∗
with the forward invariant subset being a basin of attraction.
First, construct the distance from point x ∈ X to X∗ from the metric on X , say d : X × X →
R+, by
d∗(x) := min
x∈X∗
d(x, x∗).
Since X∗ is a non-empty compact set and d(x, x∗) is continuous in x with x∗ fixed, Weierstrass
theorem assures the existence of the minimum. Thus, we have
d∗(x) ≥ 0; d∗(x) = 0 ⇔ x ∈ X∗.
Let d¯ be the shortest distance from the complement of X′ to X∗:
d¯ := min
x∈X\X′
d∗(x, x∗). (12)
Maximum theorem guarantees continuity of d∗ : X → R+ by continuity of d(x, x∗) in both x and
x∗. Besides, X \ X′ is a non-empty compact subset by X′ ( X and the openness of X′. Hence, the
minimum in (12) exists. It follows that
d¯ > 0; d∗(x) < d¯ ⇒ x ∈ X′. (13)
Define set X′0 ⊂ cl X′ by
X′0 := cl X′ ∩ d∗−1([d¯/2,∞)).
Since both cl X′ and d∗−1([d¯/2,∞)) are closed, X′0 is closed and thus compact in X . It is not empty,
37Note that A˘ in the proof (Zusai, 2018b, p.25) should be defined as a subset of cl X′. Then, with the observation that
forward invariance of X′ implies (11), the proof for the previous version applies to part ii) of the current version.
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Figure 5: Sets in the proof of Theorem 2.
as proven below. Suppose X′0 = ∅; then, any x ∈ X with d∗(x) ≥ d¯/2 must be out of cl X′. On
the other hand, since cl X′ is not empty, X′ has at least one boundary point x0; then, d∗(x0) ≥ d¯.38
By the former statement, this implies x0 /∈ cl X′ but it contradicts with x0 being on the boundary
of X′; hence, X′0 cannot be empty.
Let w¯ be the minimum of W in X′0;
w¯ := min
x∈X′0
W(x).
Since X′0 is compact and nonempty and W is (Lipschitz) continuous, the minimum exists. Further,
it is positive; we have X′0 ⊂ cl X′ by construction and W(x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ cl X′ by condition i) and
continuity of W, while no element x ∈ X′0 belongs to X∗ since d(x, x∗) ≥ d¯ > 0 for any x ∈ X′0.
Because X∗ = cl X′ ∩W−1(0) by condition b) and X′0 ⊂ cl X′, it implies x ∈ X′0 ⇒ W(x) > 0.
Hence we have w¯ > 0 and
[
x ∈ cl X′ and d∗(x) ≥ d¯/2
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
i.e., x∈X′0
⇒ W(x) ≥ w¯. (14)
Define set X′′ ⊂ X′ by
X′′ = W−1([0, w¯/2)) ∩ X′. (15)
38We can make a sequence converging to x0 by elements out of X′, whose distance from X∗ cannot be smaller than
d¯.
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This set is an (open) neighborhood of X∗ by X∗ ⊂ X′′, since W = 0 at anywhere in X∗ and
X∗ ⊂ X′. X′′ is wholly contained in set d−1∗ ([0, d¯/2)). Assume that there exists x ∈ X′′ such that
d∗(x) ≥ d¯/2. These jointly imply W(x) ≥ w¯ by (14) since x ∈ X′′ ⊂ X′ ⊂ cl X′. However, this
contradicts with W(x) ∈ [0, w¯/2) for x to belong to X′′. Hence, we have
x ∈ X′′ ⇒ d∗(x) < d¯/2. (16)
We prove X′′ is forward invariant. To verify it by contradiction, assume that there is a Carathe´odory
solution trajectory {xt} starting from X′′ but escaping X′′ at some moment of time:
x0 ∈ X′′, and xT /∈ X′′ at some T > 0.
The statement xT /∈ X′′ means xT /∈ X′ or W(xT) > w¯/2. In the former case, we have d∗(xT) ≥ d¯
by (12) while d∗(x0) < d¯/2 by (16). By continuity of d∗(x) in x and of xt in t on a Carathe´odory
solution trajectory {xt}, d∗(xt) is continuous in t; hence, there exists a moment of time T′ ∈ (0, T)
such that d∗(xT′) = 0.9d¯ ∈ (0.5d¯, d¯) ⊂ (d∗(x0), d∗(xT)). At this point, xT′ /∈ X′′ by (16) while
xT′ ∈ X′ by (12); thus, W(xT′) ≥ w¯/2. Hence, the first case of escaping X′′ implies the existence of
T′ > 0 such that
W(xT′) ≥ w¯/2 and xT′ ∈ X′.
If xT ∈ X′′ but xT ∈ X′, then this is satisfied with T′ = T.
This implies the existence of T¯ ∈ (0, T] such that
W(xT¯) ≥ w¯/2, and
[
xt ∈ X′ for all t ≤ T¯
]
. (17)
To prove it, assume xt′ /∈ X′ at some t′ ≤ T, i.e., the negation of the latter condition at T¯ = T;
if there is no such t′ ≤ T, then it suggests that the claim (17) holds at T¯ = T, with the fact
W(xT) ≥ w¯/2. By (13), the hypothesis xt′ /∈ X′ implies d∗(xt′) ≥ d¯. Again, by continuity of d∗(xt)
in t, the set {t ≤ t′ | d∗(xt) ≥ d¯} is closed and thus compact; with the fact d∗(x0) < d¯/2, this
implies the existence of the minimum T¯ in this set and T¯ > 0. That is, we have d∗(xT¯) = d¯ while
d∗(xt) < d¯ for all t ≤ T¯. The former implies W(xT¯) ≥ w¯ by (14). Thus, the above claim (17) holds
at T¯ ∈ (0, T].
In (17), the latter condition implies xt ∈ X′ at all t ≤ T¯ by (13). Since condition (a) and (7) holds
everywhere in X′, we have W˙(xτ) ≤ W˜(xτ) ≤ 0 at almost all τ ≤ T¯;39 thus, we have
W(xT¯) ≤W(x0) +
∫ T¯
0
≤W(x0).
Since W(x0) < w¯/2 by x0 ∈ X′′, we have W(xT¯) < w¯/2. This contradicts with W(xT¯) ≥ w¯/2.
Therefore, the hypothesis cannot hold: any Carathe´odory solution trajectory {xt} starting from
39A Carathe´odory solution trajectory is differentiable at almost all moments of time, though it may not be so at all
moments.
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X′′ cannot escape X′′ at any moment of time. That is, X′′ is forward invariant.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. Notice that, for any za ∈ Va[pi], we have
za ·pi = ∑
A′a⊂A\{a}
PAa(A′a)Q(pi∗[A′a]− pia)(pi∗[A′a]− pia).
i) Assumption Q1-i) implies that Q(pi∗[A′a] − pia) = 0 if pi∗[pi; A′a] − pia < 0. Hence, the
product of these two terms is always non-negative. As PAa[·] ≥ 0, this implies za · pi ≥ 0. As
V(x)[pi] = ∑ xaVa[pi], this further implies ∆x ·pi = ∑ xaza ·pi ≥ 0 for any ∆x = ∑ xaza ∈ V(x)[pi]:
part i) is verified.
ii) The “if” part is immediate from Theorem 1-i), as x ∈ ∆A(b∗[pi]) implies V(x)[pi] = {0}.
For the “only-if” part, assume x /∈ ∆A(b∗[pi]). Then, there is a suboptimal action a /∈ b∗[pi]
played by a positive mass xa > 0. Suboptimality means pi∗ > pia. By Assumption A1, there exists
an available set A′a such that A′a ∩ b∗[pi] 6= ∅ and PAa(A′a) > 0; the former implies pi∗[A′a] =
pi∗ > pia. It follows that Q(pi∗[A′a]− pia) > 0 by Assumption Q1. Therefore, for this A′a, we have
PAa[A′a]Q(pi∗[A′a]− pia)(pi∗[A′a]− pia) > 0; thus, we have za ·pi > 0 for this suboptimal action a,
regardless of za ∈ Va[pi]. As xa > 0, we have z ·pi ≥ xaza ·pi > 0 for any ∆x = ∑ xaza ∈ V(x)[pi]:
the contrapositive of the “only-if” part is verified.
C Appendix to Section 4
C.1 Proof of Theorem 4
Properties of gain functions
The properties of the aggregate gain functions G and H in Theorem 4 come from similar properties
of the individual expected gain functions g, h as stated in the following claims. The proofs of these
claims are given in the next subsection.
Lemma 1. Consider an evolutionary dynamic V that satisfies Assumptions Q1, and A1. Then, the expected
first-order gain function g∗ = (ga∗)a∈A : RA → RA satisfies the following properties.
g0 i) ga∗[pi] ≥ 0 for any a ∈ A and pi ∈ RA. ii) ga∗[pi] = 0 if and only if a ∈ b∗(pi).
g1 Further assume Assumption A2. Consider arbitrary two actions a, b ∈ A; assume pia ≤ pib. Then, i)
gb∗[pi] ≤ ga∗[pi]. ii) The inequality is strict if pia < pib.
g2 For each a ∈ A, function ga∗ : RA → R is differentiable almost everywhere inRA. If it is differentiable
at pi ∈ RA,
∂ga∗
∂pi
[pi]∆pi = za · ∆pi for any ∆pi ∈ RA, za ∈ Va[pi] (18)
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Lemma 2. Assume that the expected gain function g∗ : RA → RA satisfies property g1.40 Then, the
expected second-order gain function h∗ = (ha∗)a∈A : RA → RA satisfies the following property.
h i) ha∗[pi] ≤ 0 for any a ∈ A and pi ∈ RA. ii) ha∗[pi] = 0 if and only if a ∈ b∗(pi).
gh For any a ∈ A and pi ∈ RA,
ha∗[pi] = za · g∗[pi] for any za ∈ Va[pi].
Property g0 guarantees that the expected first-order gain cannot be negative; a switch of an
action does not decrease the agent’s payoff myopically—as long as the payoff vector is unchanged.
Further, the expected gain becomes zero if and only if the current action is indeed myopically
optimal among all the actions.
Properties g1 and h are parallel. The former property means that, as long as an agent switches
from one action to another, the expected gain after the switch cannot be greater than that before
the switch. If the new action yields a strictly greater payoff than the old, the expected gain needs
to become strictly smaller. As a result, the average of the expected gains over all the switchable
new actions cannot be greater than the expected gain of switch from the current action; so the
expected second-order gain cannot be positive. Further, if the current action is not optimal, then
there must be a better action and thus the average of the new expected gains after the switch must
be strictly smaller than the expected gain before the switch by the switch; the second-order gain
must be strictly negative. And, the opposite is also true.
To understand property g2, imagine a change in payoff vector by ∆pi. If a revising agent
chooses to switch from current action a to any of optimal actions in the realized available action
set A′a, the net gain is pi∗[A′a] − pia − q; thus, the change in payoff vector ∆pi changes this gain
by ∆pi∗[A′a] − ∆pia regardless of q, as long as the switch occurs. In the proof, we find that the
linear approximation of change in the first-order expected gain ga∗[pi] caused by this change ∆pi
is obtained by the expected sum of the change in the gain from such a switch ∆pi∗[A′a] − ∆pia
weighted with the current probability of each of possible switches from a, i.e., with probability
PAa(A′a)Q(pi∗[A′a]− pia); this weighted sum is simply za ·pi.
Notice that property g1 means that the ordering of actions by the expected gains is obtained
by reversing the payoff ordering. As we noted in the definition of ha∗, when a revising agent
optimizes a new action to maximize the payoff among the available actions in A′a, any of the
optimum actions yields the (same) smallest expected gains in A′a. Therefore, whichever of the
(potentially) multiple optimum actions the agent chooses in the switch, the minimum expected
gain g∗∗[pi; A′a] will be the expected gain from the next switch given that the payoff is unchanged
from pi.
40No other assumptions or properties are needed. Once property g1 is satisfied, any assumption is not needed.
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Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. g0. i) is immediate from the definition of ga∗. Note that the term EQ[pi∗[A′a] − pia − q]+
reflects the fact that a revising agent switches to a different new action only if pi∗[A′a] ≥ pia; so
does this non-negativity of ga∗.
For the only-if part of ii), first assume a ∈ b∗[pi]. Then, pia ≥ pi∗[A′a] ≥ pi∗[A′a] − q for any
A′a ⊂ A \ {a}, as long as q ≥ 0. Thus, Assumption Q1-i) implies [pi∗[A′a]− pia − q]+ = 0 almost
surely. Thus, ga∗(pi) = 0.
For the “if” part of ii), we prove its contrapositive by assuming the existence of b ∈ A such
that pib > pia and then deriving ga∗(pi) > 0. Assumption A1 implies the existence of A′a ⊂ A\ {a}
such that PAa(A′a) > 0 such that b ∈ A′a. In such a set A′a, we have pi∗[A′a] ≥ pib > pia. Then, by
Assumption Q1, it is guaranteed that Q(pi∗[A′a]− pia) > 0 and thus EQ[pi∗[A′a]− pia − q]+ > 0.
Therefore, we have ga∗(pi) > 0.
g1. Make a partition of A according to pi, say A1,A2, . . . such as
[a, a′ ∈ Ai ⇔ pia = pia′ ] and [a ∈ Ai and a′ ∈ Ai′ with i < i′ ⇔ pia > pia′ ].
Let pii be the payoff obtained from actions in setAi: i.e., pii is defined as pia with some (and indeed
all) a ∈ Ai. Ai is the set of actions that yield the i-th greatest payoff pii among {pia | a ∈ A}.
Define piA,a by
piA,a := PAa({Aia ⊂ A \ {a} | Aia ∪Ai 6= ∅ and Aia ∪Aj = ∅ for any j < i}) for each i.
Given the current action a, the maximal feasible payoff after the revision becomes pii with proba-
bility piA,a. For set A
i
a, we have pi∗[Aia] = pii. Assumption A1 implies p1A,a > 0.
Let I(a) be the index of the partition that a belongs to: i.e., a ∈ AI(a). Notice that
ga∗(pi) =
I(a)−1
∑
i=1
piA,aEQ[pii − pia − q]+.
If pia ≤ pib, then I(a) ≥ I(b) as well as
EQ[pii − pia − q]+ ≥ EQ[pii − pib − q]+. for any i (19)
Since a, b /∈ ⋃Ii=1Ai as I < I(b) ≤ I(a), we obtain
I
∑
i=1
piA,a = PAa
(
{Aia | Aia ∪ (
I⋃
i=1
Ai) 6= ∅}
)
= PAb
(
{Aib | Aib ∪ (
I⋃
i=1
Ai) 6= ∅}
)
=
I
∑
i=1
piA,b
for all I < I(b) by applying Assumption A2 to Aab =
⋃I
i=1Ai. Hence, we have
piA,a = p
i
A,b for all i < I(b). (20)
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Combining this with (19), we obtain part i):
ga∗(pi) =
I(b)−1
∑
i=1
piA,aEQ[pii − pia − q]+ +
I(a)−1
∑
i=I(b)
piA,aEQ[pii − pia − q]+
≥ gb∗(pi) =
I(b)−1
∑
i=1
piA,bEQ[pii − pib − q]+.
Further, if pia < pib, then I(a) > I(b). As pia < pib ≤ pi1, Assumption Q1 implies Q(pi1 −
pia) > 0 and thus EQ[pi1 − pia − q]+ > EQ[pi1 − pib − q]+. With the fact p1A,a > 0, it guarantees
ga∗(pi) > gb∗(pi), part ii) of property g1.
g2. First of all, let b(A′a) ∈ A′a be a choice for each non-empty available action set A′a 6= ∅; we
could call b : 2A\{a} \ ∅ → A \ {a} a policy function for a revising agent to make a choice after
observing (non-empty) available action set. Let B be the set of all such policy functions; notice
that it is a finite set as long as A is a finite set. Define the expected gain from policy b, gab, by
gab(pi) := ∑
A′a⊂A\{a}
PAa(A′a)EQ[pib(A′a) − pia − q]+.
If an agent follows the randomly constrained optimization protocol (4), b(A′a) should be chosen
from b∗(A′a) in each possible realization of A′a; thus,
ga∗(pi) = max
b∈B
gab(pi).
Specifically, the maximum is attained by a policy b∗ ∈ B such that b∗(A′a) ∈ b∗[A′a] ⊂ A′a.
With b fixed arbitrarily in B, function gab is differentiable and the derivative is bounded:
∂gab
∂pib
(pi) =

−∑A′a⊂A\{a}PAa(A′a)Q(pib(A′a) − pia) ∈ [−1, 0] if b = a,
∑ A′a⊂A\{a}
s.t. b∈b(A′a)[pi]
PAa(A′a)Q(pib(A′a) − pia) ∈ [0, 1] otherwise
for each action b ∈ A. Therefore,
∂gab
∂pi
(pi)∆pi = ∑
A′a⊂A\{a}
PAa(A′a)Q(pib(A′a) − pia)(∆pib(A′a) − ∆pia).
As the derivative vector of gab is bounded in [−1, 1]A, function gab is Lipschitz continuous on
RA; it implies that the maximal value function ga∗ is also Lipschitz continuous and differentiable
almost everywhere inRA by a version of Danskin’s envelop theorem in (Hofbauer and Sandholm,
2009, Theorem A.4). By applying the above equation to b = b∗ and noticing pib∗(A′a) = pi∗(A′a),
we obtain
dga∗
dpi
[pi]∆pi = ∑
A′a⊂A\{a}
PAa(A′a)Q(pi∗[A′a]− pia)(∆pi∗[A′a]− ∆pia) for any ∆pi ∈ RA.
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On the other hand, any za ∈ Va(x)[pi] satisfies
za · ∆pi = ∑
A′a⊂A\{a}
PAa(A′a)Q(pi∗[A′a]− pia))(ya[pi; A′a]− ea) · ∆pi.
with some ya[pi; A′a] ∈ ∆A(b∗[pi; A′a]). We have ya[pi; A′a] · ∆pi = ∆pi∗[A′a]; and, ea · ∆pi = ∆pia.
Combining these, we have (18).
Remark. From this proof, we can see that the role of Assumption A2 is to obtain (20) for property
g1. One might think of somewhat simpler conditions that look similar to Assumption A2:
i) For any a, b ∈ A and c ∈ A \ {a, b}, PAa({A′a | c ∈ A′a}) = PAb({A′b | c ∈ A′b}). That is,
the probability that an arbitrary strategy is available should not depend on the status quo, as
long as the strategy is not a status-quo.
ii) For any a, b ∈ A and Aab ⊂ A \ {a, b}, PAa(Aab) = PAb(Aab). That is, for any subset that
excludes both a and b, the probability that the available strategy set coincides exactly with
this subset does not depend which of the excluded two actions is the status quo.
However, neither of these two simpler conditions cannot assure (20). Each of the following
cases satisfy one of the above two conditions but not Assumption A2; as a result, (20) does not
hold. When checking the violation of (20), the payoff vector pi is assumed to yield the payoff
ranking such that pie > pid > pic > pib > pia.
i) Assume that, when a is the status quo, then the available strategy set is {b} with probability
0.4, {c, d}with 0.3 and {e}with 0.3. When b is the status quo, then the available strategy set is {a}
with probability 0.4, {c} with 0.3 and {d, e} with 0.3.
Condition i) is satisfied, since each of c, d, e is available with probability 0.3 whether the status
quo is a or b. However, Assumption A2 is not satisfied since at least d or e is available with
probability PAa(A′a | A′a ∩ {d, e} 6= ∅) = PAa({c, d}) +PAa({e}) = 0.6 when a is the status quo
while this probability is PAb(A′b | A′b ∩ {d, e} 6= ∅) = PAa({d, e}) = 0.3.
Note that, if the second best d is available, the first best a is not available when a is the status
quo while a is also available when b is the status quo. As a result, the probability that the second
best b is the best available strategy is p2A,a = 0.3 when a is the status quo while it is p
2
A,b = 0 when
b is the status quo. Thus, (20) does not hold. This is because condition i) allows correlation of
availabilities of distinct two strategies to vary with the status quo.
ii) Assume that, when a is the status quo, then the available strategy set is {b} with probability
0.8, {b, c, d} with 0.1, and {b, e} with 0.1. When b is the status quo, then the available strategy set
is {a} with probability 0.8, {a, c} with 0.1, and {a, d, e} with 0.1.
Condition ii) is satisfied, since no subset that excludes both a and b is available with any pos-
itive probability when either a or b is the status quo. (Note that condition i) is also satisfied.)
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However, Assumption A2 is not satisfied since at least d or e is available with probability 0.2 when
a is the status quo while this probability is 0.1.
Similarly to the counterexample for condition i), PAa and PAb have different correlations be-
tween availabilities of the first best action e and the second best action d; this results in p2A,a =
0.2 6= 0.1 = p2A,b.
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. h. Part i) is immediate from g1-i). For part ii), first consider action a such that a ∈ b∗(pi).
Then, any other action b ∈ A yields pib ≤ pia; by g1-i) again, it is equivalent to gb∗[pi] ≥ ga∗[pi];
thus, g∗∗[pi; A′a] = minb∈A′a gb∗[pi] ≥ ga∗[pi]. So ha∗(pi) cannot be strictly negative. With part i)
of this property h, this implies ha∗[pi] = 0. For the opposite, assume ha∗[pi] < 0. Then, there must
exist A′a such that PAa(A′a) > 0, Q(pi∗[A′a]− pia) > 0 and g∗∗[pi; A′a]− ga∗[pi] < 0. By property
g1-ii), it must be the case that pi∗[A′a] > pia; there exists an action in A′a ⊂ A \ {a} that is better
than a. Therefore, a /∈ b∗[pi].
gh. First of all, any actions in b∗[pi; A′a] yield the greatest payoff pi∗[A′a] among all the available
actions in A′a; property g1 implies that they yield the smallest first-order gain g∗∗[pi; A′a] among
them. Thus, any mixture ya[pi; A′a] ∈ ∆A(b∗[pi; A′a) satisfies
ya[pi; A′a] · g∗[pi] = g∗∗[pi; A′a].
With the fact ea · g∗[pi] = ga∗[pi] and the assumption za ∈ Va[pi], this implies the equation in
property gh.
Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. G. i) is immediately obtained from property g0-i and the fact x ∈ RA+. For ii), notice that
x ∈ ∆A(b∗[pi]) is equivalent to xa > 0 ⇒ a ∈ b∗[pi]; and, by g0-i), G(x)[pi] = 0 is equiva-
lent to [xa > 0 ⇒ ga∗(pi) = 0]. The equivalence between a ∈ b∗[pi] and ga∗(pi) = 0 has been
established in g0-ii). Thus, combining these, we obtain G-ii).
H. Each of the two parts can be readily verified from property h, similarly to the proof of property
G.
GH i) Since ∆x ∈ V(x)[pi] = ∑a∈A xaVa[pi] by (6), there exists (za)a∈A such that ∆x = ∑a∈A xaza
and za ∈ Va[pi] for each a. By property gh, we have
∆x · g∗[pi] = ∑
a∈A
xaza · g∗[pi] = ∑
a∈A
xaha∗[pi] = H(x)[pi].
By Assumption A3, g∗[pi] is constant to x; thus, G(x)[pi] = g∗[pi] · x is linear in x with coefficient
g∗[pi], when pi is fixed. Thus, ∂G/∂x ≡ g∗[pi]. Plugging this into the above equation, we obtain
part i) of property GH.
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ii) As G(x)[pi] = x · g∗[pi], property g2 implies
∂G
∂pi
(x)[pi∆pi = ∑
a∈A
xa
∂ga∗
∂pi
[pi]∆pi = ∑
a∈A
xaza · ∆pi
for any za ∈ Va[pi]. Since ∆x ∈ V [pi](x) = ∑a∈A xaVa[pi] by (6), this implies part ii) of property
GH.
D Appendix to Section 5
D.1 Proof of Theorem 6
Pseudo-transitivity theorem on a Lyapunov function
For Theorem 6, we use a pseudo-transivitity theorem on a Lyapunov function as below
Theorem 10. Let X1 ⊃ X2 ⊃ X∗ be three non-empty subsets of a compact space X ; assume that X∗
is closed and X1 is open. Suppose that two Lipschitz continuous functions W1, W2 : X1 → R and two
continuous functions W˜1, W˜2 : X1 → R satisfy the following assumptions: for any x ∈ X1,
a) i) W1(x) ≥ 0, ii) W˜1(x) ≤ 0, iii) W˙1(x) ≤ W˜1(x) and iv) cl X1∩W1−1(0) = cl X1∩ W˜−11 (0) = cl X2;
b) i) W2(x) ≥ 0, ii)
[
x ∈ X2 ⇒ W˜2(x) ≤ 0
]
, iii) W˙2(x) ≤ W˜2(x) and iv) cl X2 ∩W2−1(0) = cl X2 ∩
W˜−12 (0) = X
∗;
c) W˜1(x) + W˜2(x) ≤ 0
Then, X∗ is asymptotically stable.
Proof. Define a Lyapunov function W : X1 → R and a decaying rate function W˜ : X1 → R by
W(x) := 2W1(x) +W2(x), W˜(x) := 2W˜1(x) + W˜2(x) for each x ∈ X1.
It is immediate from assumptions a-i,iii), b-i,iii) and c) to see that
W(x) = 2W1(x) +W2(x) ≥ 0, (21)
W˜(x) = W˜1(x) + {W˜1(x) + W˜2(x)} ≤ 0, (22)
W˙(x) = 2W˙1(x) + W˙2(x) ≤ 2W˜1(x) + W˜2(x) = W˜(x). (23)
for each x ∈ X1. Further, since X∗ ⊂ X2, it follows assumptions a-iv) and b-iv) that W(x) =
W˜(x) = 0 if x ∈ X∗; thus X∗ is contained by cl X1 ∩W−1(0) and cl X1 ∩ W˜−1(0) by X∗ ⊂ X2 ⊂
X1 ⊂ cl X1. For the contrary, assume W(x) = 0 at x ∈ cl X1 first. By assumptions a-i) and b-i),
it must be the case that W1(x) = 0 and W2(x) = 0. The former implies x ∈ cl X2 by assumption
a-iv). Together with this, the latter implies x ∈ X∗. Separately from this, now assume W˜(x) = 0 at
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x ∈ cl X1. By assumptions a-ii) and c), it must be the case that W˜1(x) = 0 and W˜1(x)+ W˜2(x) = 0.41
The former implies x ∈ cl X2 by assumption a-iv); besides, by plugging the former into the latter,
we have W˜2(x) = 0. These two statements jointly imply x ∈ X∗ by assumption b-iii). In sum, we
have verified
cl X1 ∩W−1(0) = cl X1 ∩ W˜−1(0) = X∗. (24)
Note that the first equality is due to the fact that X∗ ⊂ X1 and thus X∗ ∩ bd X1 = ∅.
We have verified all the assumptions in Theorem 2; therefore, X∗ is asymptotically stable.
Notice that X1 may not be forward invariant, but part i) of Theorem 2 assures that we can make a
basin of attraction to X∗ by appropriately shrinking X∗.
Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. First of all, we decompose x˙ to the terms related with U and those with S and those with
both, following Sandholm (2010a). For this, define (A× A) matrices IU ,ΞS and ΦS as
(IU)ab = 1{a = b ∈ U}, (ΞS)ab = 1{a, b ∈ S}/]S, and (ΦS)ab = 1{a = b ∈ S} − (ΞS)ab
for each entry on a-th row and b-th column. Then, we have
(IUz)a =

0,
za,
(ΞSz)a =

∑
s∈S
zs/]S,
0,
(ΦSz)a =

za − (ΞSz)a for each a ∈ S;
0 for each a ∈ U
for any z ∈ RA. Note that I = ΦS + IU + ΞS. Then, the quadratic term is decomposed as
x˙ · DF(x)x˙ = (ΦSx˙) · DF(x)(ΦSx˙) + (ΦSx˙) · DF(x){(IU + ΞS)x˙}+ {(IU + ΞS)x˙} · DF(x)x˙.
As x∗ is regular ESS and F is C1, DF(x) is negative definite with respect to RAS0 as long as x is
sufficiently close to x∗. Hence, the first summation in the last line is negative since ΦSx˙ ∈ RAS0. As
a general algebraic property independent of specification of dynamics, Sandholm (2010a, pp.43–4)
proves that, for any evolutionary dynamic VF on any game with continuous payoff function F, we
have
|(ΦSx˙) · DF(x){(IU + ΞS)x˙}+ {(IU + ΞS)x˙} · DF(x)x˙|
≤ |(ΦSx˙) · DF(x){(IU + ΞS)x˙}|+ |{(IU + ΞS)x˙} · DF(x)x˙|
≤(‖ΦS‖+ 1)|x˙| · ‖ DF(x)‖ · ‖I˜S‖ · |IU x˙|
≤K|IU x˙| ≤ K ∑
a∈U
|x˙a| for any x˙ ∈ VF(x), x ∈ ∆A,
41Note that at this point, we are not sure if W˜2(x) = 0 since W˜2(x) could take a positive value unless x is in X2,
which we confirm from W˜1(x) = 0.
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where ‖ · ‖ is a spectral norm and I˜S is a matrix that depends only on S and A = ]A.42 Continuous
differentiability of F and boundedness of ∆A jointly guarantee an upper bound on ‖DF(x)‖ over
all x ∈ ∆A, while the boundedness of VF yields an upper bound on |x˙| and thus one on |Φx˙|.
Constant K > 0 is obtained by multiplying these upper bounds with (‖ΦS‖ + 1)‖I˜S‖ and then
adding 1 to ensure K > 0. Therefore, as long as DF(x) is negative definite with respect to RAS0, we
have
x˙ · DF(x)x˙ ≤ 2K ∑
u∈U
|x˙u| for any x˙ ∈ VF(x), x ∈ ∆A. (25)
From continuous differentiability of F, we know that x∗ is the unique Nash equilibrium in a
neighborhood of x∗; and, DF(x) is negative definite with respect to RAS0 at any x in a (possibly
different) neighborhood of x∗. Besides, take another neighborhood of (x∗, F(x∗)) in which M and
N satisfy properties M, N, and MN. Let ε be the smallest radius of all these three neighborhoods of
x∗ in the metric space; define X1 as an open ball around x∗ with radius ε/2 and X2 as X1 ∩ ∆A(S).
Note that cl X1 is contained in all these three neighborhoods of x∗ and thus all these statements
hold in cl X1. In addition, cl X2 = {x ∈ ∆A | |x− x∗| ≤ ε/2 and xU = 0} = cl X1 ∩ ∆A(S).
From MFU := MU [F(·)] and NFU := NU [F(·)], construct functions W1, W˜1, W2, W˜2 : X1 → R as
W1(x) := 2CKxU , W˜1(x) := −2CKMFU(x),
W2(x) := GF(x), W˜2(x) := HF(x) + 2KNFU(x).
Here we use constant K in the above equation and C in property MN. Below we verify that these
satisfy the assumptions a)–c) in Theorem 10. Note that all these four functions are continuous and,
especially, W1 and W2 are Lipschitz continuous.
a) Since x ∈ ∆A and C, K > 0, we have W1(x) := 2CK · xU ≥ 0. For any x ∈ cl X1, W1(x) = 0 if
and only if xU = 0, i.e., x ∈ cl X1 ∩ ∆A(S) = cl X2. Property M-i) implies that
W˙1(x) = 2CKx˙U ≤ −2CKMFU(x) = W˜1(x) ≤ 0.
Property M-ii) assures that cl X1 ∩ W˜−11 (0) = cl X1 ∩ ∆A(S) = cl X2.
b) By property G, we have W2(x) := GF(x) ≥ 0; besides, W2(x) = 0 if and only if x ∈ NE(F).
Thus, cl X2 ∩W2−1(0) = cl X2 ∩NE(F) = {x∗} since x∗ is the only Nash equilibrium in cl X1 by
the construction of X1. Furthermore, we have
W˙2(x) = G˙F(x) = HF(x) + x˙ · DF(x)x˙ (by property GH)
≤ HF(x) + 2K ∑
u∈U
|x˙u| (by (25))
≤ HF(x) + 2KNFU(x) = W˜2(x) (by property N)
42Spectrum norm of an arbitrary matrix M is defined as ‖M‖ = max{|Me| | ‖e‖ = 1}. We have |Mx| ≤ ‖M‖ · |x|
for any vector x and ‖MM′‖ ≤ ‖M‖ · ‖M′‖ for any matrix M′. I˜S is an (A × A)-matrix defined as (I˜S)ab := 1{a =
b} − 1{a ∈ S}/]S. Note that (IU + ΞS)z = I˜SIUz as long as z ∈ RA0 .
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for any x ∈ X1.
If x ∈ X2, xU = 0 and thus NFU(x) = 0 since 0 ≤ ∑u∈U |x˙u| ≤ NFU(x) ≤ CMFU(x) = 0 by
properties N and MN. Hence, property H implies W˜2(x) = HF(x) ≤ 0; besides, W˜2(x) = HF(x) =
0 if and only if x ∈ NE(F). Thus, cl X2 ∩ W˜−12 (0) = cl X2 ∩NE(F) = {x∗}.
c) With K > 0, properties H and MN imply
W˜1(x) + W˜2(x) = HF(x) + 2K{NFU(x)− CNFU(x)} ≤ 0.
Therefore, Theorem 10 assures asymptotic stability of x∗.
Proof of Corollary 6
Proof. Let ∆x = (∆xa)a∈A ∈ V [pi](x). For an arbitrary action a ∈ A, we can decompose the net
flow ∆xa as43
∆xa = y˜Aa − y˜aA, where y˜Aa := ∑
b∈A\{a}
y˜ba, y˜aA := ∑
b∈A\{a}
y˜ab.
Here y˜ab ∈ R+ denotes the gross flow from the mass of action a-players to that of action b-players.
Under our framework, it is exactly represented as
y˜ab = xab ∑
A′a⊂A\{a}
s.t. b∈b∗ [pi;A′a]
PAa(A′a)Q(pi∗[A′a]− pia)yab[A′a],
with some ya[A′a] ∈ ∆A(b∗[A′a]) for each A′a ⊂ A \ {a}. Thus, Assumption Q1-i) implies that
pia > pib =⇒ y˜ab = 0 for any b ∈ A \ {a}. (26)
Besides, since y˜ab ≥ 0, we have
|∆xa| ≤ y˜Aa + y˜aA for each a ∈ A.
Applying this to u ∈ U and summing up over U, we obtain
∑
u∈U
|∆xu| ≤ y˜AU + y˜UA, where y˜AU := ∑
u∈U
y˜Au, y˜UA := ∑
u∈U
y˜uA.
First, we construct function NU to satisfy property N. In a sufficiently small neighborhood of
pi0, say Π˜0, payoff difference between any two actions can be bounded as
q¯0 := 2
(
max
a′,b′∈A
pi0a′ − pi0b′
)
> |pia − pib| for any a, b ∈ A,pi ∈ Π˜0
43For a set S ⊂ A and a vector z = (za)a∈A ∈ RA whose coordinates are labeled with A, let zS be ∑a∈S za.
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and, furthermore, payoff disadvantage of actions in U compared to those in S can be maintained
as
pis > piu(x) for all s ∈ S, u ∈ U,pi ∈ Π˜0.
This implies y˜su = 0 for each s ∈ S, u ∈ U by (26) and thus y˜SU := ∑s∈S,u∈U y˜su = 0; this holds for
any ∆x ∈ V [pi](x) with pi ∈ Π˜0, x ∈ ∆A. As a result, we have y˜AU = y˜UU := ∑u,u′∈U y˜uu and thus
∑
u∈U
|∆xu| ≤ y˜UU + y˜UA ≤ 2y˜UA = 2 ∑
u∈U
y˜uA.
Here y˜uA is the total outflow from the mass of action-u players. From our formulation, it is imme-
diate to see that, with Q¯N := Q(q¯0),
y˜aA = xa ∑
A′a⊂A\{a}
PAa(A′a)Q(pi∗[A′a]− pia) ≤ Q¯Nxa for each a ∈ A. (27)
By this equation (27), the above equation reduces to
∑
u∈U
|∆xu| ≤ 2Q¯N ∑
u∈U
y˜uA ≤ 2Q¯N ∑
u∈U
xu.
Thus, we define NU as NU [pi](x) := 2Q¯N ∑u∈U xu; then, we have ∑u∈U |∆xu| ≤ NU [pi](x) for any
∆x ∈ V [pi](x),pi ∈ Π0, x ∈ ∆A.
Now we construct function MU [pi](x) to guarantee property M; then, we will see that it also
satisfies property MN. The above argument is again applied to obtain
∆xU = y˜UU − y˜UA = −y˜US.
By the definition of Π0, if available action set A′u ∈ A \U contains some action s ∈ S, then any
pi ∈ Π0 satisfies
pi∗[A′u] ≥ pis > piu′ for all u′ ∈ U.
The strict inequality implies b∗[pi; A′u] ⊂ S. In a dynamic under our framework, it means that a
revising agent must switch action to an action in S if the above action set A′u is available. Therefore,
we have
y˜uS ≥ xu ∑
A′u∈A
s.t. A′u∩S 6=∅
PAu[A′u]Q(pi∗[A′u]− piu(x)) · 1 (28)
Since S and U are finite sets, there exists the minimum of the following minimization:
pˆi0 := min
s∈S
u∈U
pi0s − pi0u. (29)
Since all of pi0s −pi0u are (strictly) positive for any pair (s, u) ∈ S×U, the existence of the minimum
then guarantees pˆi0 > 0. Continuity of the minimum function further implies that, in a sufficiently
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small neighborhood of pi0, say Π0 ⊂ Π˜0, we have
pis − piu ≥ min
s∈S
u∈U
pis − piu > pˆi0/2.
By Assumption Q1, it implies
Q(pis − piu) ≥ Q¯M := Q(pˆi0/2) > 0 for all pi ∈ Π0.
Furthermore, Assumption A1, we have
P¯S := min
u∈U ∑A′u∈A
s.t. A′u∩S 6=∅
PAu[A′u] > 0. (30)
Plugging these two equations into (28), we have
y˜uS ≥ xuQ¯M ∑
A′u∈A
s.t. A′u∩S 6=∅
PAu[A′u] ≥ xuQ¯MP¯S.
Summing this over all u ∈ U, we obtain
∆xU = −y˜US ≤ −Q¯MP¯SxU ≤ 0. (31)
for any ∆x ∈ V [pi](x) at any pi ∈ Π0, x ∈ ∆A. The last inequality follows the fact that P¯S, Q¯M > 0
as shown above and xU ≥ 0 by x ∈ ∆A. Let MU [pi](x) := Q¯MP¯SxU ; then the above equation
suggests that property M-i) holds. Further, MU [pi](x) = 0 if and only if xU = 0 since Q¯MP¯S > 0.
Furthermore, with C := 2Q¯N/(Q¯MP¯S) > 0, we have
CMU [pi](x) ≡ CQ¯MP¯SxU ≡ 2Q¯NxU ≡ MU [pi](x)
for any pi ∈ RA, x ∈ ∆A. Thus, property MN holds.
For an arbitrary regular rationalizable dynamic, we have verified that the pair of the functions
MU and NU satisfies properties M, N and MN especially in the neighborhoodΠ0×∆A of (pi0, x0).
(Actually, no restriction to x is needed.) With Theorem 4, this suggests that a regular rationalizable
dynamic satisfies the assumptions for Theorem 6 and thus guarantees asymptotic stability of a
regular ESS.
D.2 Comparison with Friedman’s order compatibility
Since rationalizable dynamics guarantee local stability of a regular ESS while order compatibility
in Friedman (1991) does not, it would be immediate to see that order compatibility does not im-
ply rationalizability. But, why is that so? For this, consider the example that suggested possible
instability under order compatible dynamics.
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TF3>F2>F1
F2>F3>F1
Figure 6: Phase diagram of order compatible dynamics in Example 6, borrowed from Friedman
(1991, Figure 7). The labels of the payoff orderings and point T (those in roman) are added to the
original. The solid small arrows on the original figure indicate the possible ranges of transition
vectors under order compatible dynamics.
Example 6 (Friedman 1991, Counterexample 2). Consider a linear one-population game F : ∆3 →
R3 given by
F(x) :=
 −5 −26 3134 −5 −29
−29 31 −2
 x.
This game has a unique Nash equilibrium at x∗ = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3). The game is indeed strictly
contractive and x∗ is a regular ESS.
One can construct an order compatible dynamic that does not converge to x∗ “by always pick-
ing tangent vectors [from the cone of the order compatible vectors at each point of the state]
close to the outer edge of the cones [of order compatible transition vectors]” (p.655). Call such
a dynamic the diverging extreme dynamic. For example, consider an interior state x where
F3(x) > F2(x) > F1(x). Thus, order compatibility requires the transition vector z to satisfy
z3 > z2 > z1. The transition vector in the diverging extreme dynamic should particularly have
z3 = z2 > 0 > z1. Thus, the dynamic should give the second best action 2 as large net inflow as
the first best action 3.
Under a rationaliable dynamic, a transition vector z should take a form such as
z2 = x1PA1({2})Q(F2(x)− F1(x)) −
gross flow from 2 to 3︷ ︸︸ ︷
x2PA2({A2 | 3 ∈ A2})Q(F3(x)− F2(x)),
z3 = x1PA1({A1 | 3 ∈ A1})Q(F3(x)− F1(x)) +x2PA2({A2 | 3 ∈ A2})Q(F3(x)− F2(x)). (32)
The gross flow from action 2 to action 3 (the identical second terms after the minus/plus signs in
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the two equations) is (strictly) positive by x2 > 0 and Assumptions Q1 and A1. Beside, since Q is
non-decreasing, we have Q(F3(x)− F1(x)) ≥ Q(F2(x)− F1(x)). Therefore, z3 = z2 holds only if
PA1({2}) > PA1({A1 | 3 ∈ A1}).
In other words, for an agent who has been choosing action 1, it must be more likely to have action
2 available but 3 not available than to have action 3 available:
Now, consider an inner state where F2(x) > F3(x) > F1(x) and the transition vector z in the
diverging extreme dynamic should satisfy z2 = z3 > 0 > z1. By the same token as above, it must
be the case for rationalizing z2 = z3 that an agent who has taken action 1 is now more likely to
have action 3 available but 1 not than having action 2 available:
PA1({3}) > PA1({A1 | 2 ∈ A1}).
Since PA1({b}) ≤ PA1({A1 | b ∈ A1}) for any b ∈ A \ {1} = {2, 3}, the above two equations
contradict each other. In other words, our framework (especially, Assumption A3 and indepen-
dence of the availability of each action from payoff ordering of the actions) prohibits PA1 from
favoring one action than another in one state but opposing it in the other state, while the diverg-
ing extreme dynamic needs to favor the second best response action at each state and the second
best action (or the payoff ordering) may change as the state x moves.
On the other hand, rationalizable dynamics may not be order compatible and the reason can
be found in the distribution of available action sets. To see it, let’s go back to Friedman’s example.
Example 7. Now consider a point where F3(x) > F2(x) > F1(x). According to (32), a rationalizable
dynamic may have z2 > z3 and thus violates order compatibility if i) PA1({2})  PA1({A1 | 3 ∈
A1}) and ii) Q(F3(x)− F1(x)) ≈ Q(F2(x)− F1(x))  Q(F3(x)− F2(x)) ≈ 0. Below we concretely
find rationalizable dynamics that satisfy these two conditions.
First, we can make PA· to satisfy condition i) as well as Assumptions A1, A2 and A3: for
example,
PA1({2}) = 3/4, PA1({3}) = 1/4;
PA2({1}) = 3/4, PA2({1, 3}) = 1/4;
PA3({1, 2}) = 1/4, PA3({1}) = 1/4.
Note that, regardless of the current action, action 1 is available with probability 1, action 2 with
1/4 and action 3 with 1/4 as long as the action is not the current action.
To meet condition ii), focus on an inner state x near the boundary F3 = F2 but a little away
from F2 = F1, i.e., near the intersection of F3 = F2 and x1 + x2 = 1 (i.e., x3 = 0); see point T on
Figure 6. While satisfying Assumption Q1, let function Q(q) be strictly increasing until q increases
to F3(x)− F2(x) ≈ 0 but let it be constant when q is between F2(x)− F1(x) and F3(x)− F1(x).
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The rationalizable dynamic with such PA· and Q fails order compatibility but still guarantees
Nash stability in this game and thus (not only local but) global stability of the unique regular ESS.
E Appendix to Section 6
E.1 Excess payoff dynamics
Modification of the base framework
In Brown-von Neumann-Nash (BNN) dynamic, a revising agent compares the payoff of each ac-
tion with the average payoff of the whole population; the payoff difference is called excess payoff.
The agent switches to an action with probability proportional to the excess payoff if it is posi-
tive. The class of excess payoff target dynamic is generalization of BNN dynamic by allowing the
switching probability to be any increasing function of the excess payoff.
Excess payoff dynamics cannot be fit into our framework, because the benchmark for the re-
vising agent’s payoff comparison is the society’s average x · pi, not the payoff of the agent’s own
current action. This can be interpreted as if the agent who do not choose to “switch” the action
would just follow the society’s action distribution x as its own default (mixed) strategy.44 How-
ever, with a similar idea as for the other dynamics, we can define the gain function for excess
payoff dynamics.
Everything else is the same as the base framework. If the agent chooses to switch an action,
then it chooses a pure strategy of some particular action, as long as it is available, though it needs
to pay the switching cost q. Available action set A′ ⊂ A is randomly drawn from probability
distribution PA on the power set of A; switching cost q follows probability distribution PQ on
R+. A newborn agent compares the net payoffs from pure strategies of available actions with
the expected payoff from the status quo mixed strategy x; then he decides whether to maintain
the status quo or to pay a cost to take a pure strategy of an available action. On PQ we maintain
Assumption Q1. On PA, we modify Assumption A1:
Assumption (A1’). For any b ∈ A, there is A′ ⊂ A such that PA(A′) > 0 and b ∈ A′.
Assumption A2 does not make sense for this situation and thus we drop it.
The (gross) payoff difference between an available pure strategy of action a and the status-quo
mixed strategy x is indeed the excess payoff of the action, i.e., pˆia := pia − pi · x. In other words,
we assume x as the status quo because the excess payoffs pˆi is the basis of payoff comparisons in
excess payoff dynamics.
As a result, a revising agent who faces A′ as the available action set chooses to take an action
from b∗[A′] if pˆi∗[A′] is greater than realized switching cost q, i.e., with probability Q(pˆi∗[A′]).
44 To better interpret the excess payoff target dynamics, imagine a birth-death process over generations, rather than
a revision process of immortal agents. When one agent dies, there is a birth of another new agent; so the mass of agents
is a fixed constant. The birth and death process follows a Poisson process with arrival rate 1, as same as the revision
opportunity in our standard setting. The default status-quo strategy for a new born agent is a random choice from the
whole population, i.e., the current population state x as a status-quo mixed strategy.
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Otherwise, the agent picks an action according to x as a mixed strategy. Thus, the transition of the
social state follows
x˙ ∈ V(x)[pi] = ∑
A′⊂A
PA(A′)
(
Q(pˆi∗[A′])∆A(b∗[pi; A′] + (1−Q(pˆi∗[A′]))x
)
− x
= ∑
A′⊂A
PA(A′)Q(pˆi∗[A′])
(
∆A(b∗[pi; A′]− x
)
.
We call an evolutionary dynamic constructed in this way a birth-death rationalizable dynamic. It
includes excess payoff dynamics such as the BNN dynamic and also allows some new dynamics.
Example 8 ((k-)BNN dynamic: Sandholm 2010b, Exercise 5.5.1). LetPA({a}) = 1/A for each a ∈ A
and Q(pˆi) = ([pˆi]+)k. k = 1 reduces to the standard BNN dynamic. As k → ∞, the switch to the
best response dominates all the other switches and thus the behavior of the dynamic should look
like the standard BRD.
Example 9 (Restricted BRD without hysteresis). We could allow a non-trivial restriction to the
available action set, just as Example 3. The difference is in the status quo. In Example 3, an
agent who chooses the status quo returns to take an action that has been taken so far. Under this
modified framework, the status quo is x as the mixed strategy.
Example 10 (“Tempered” BRD without hysteresis). Let PA(A) = 1 (i.e., all actions are always
available) and Q(pˆi) being an increasing function of pˆi, just like the tempered BRD (Example 1).
However, in this excess payoff framework, an agent who chooses the status quo take x and thus
any hysteresis of the agent’s past action disappears. Thus, unlike the tempered BRD, the temper-
ing function Q only changes the speed of the dynamic but the trajectory itself is exactly the same
as that under the standard BRD.
Equilibrium stability
Now we can define an individual’s first-order gain g∗(pi, x) as
g∗(pi, x) := ∑
A′⊂A
PA(A′)EQ[pˆi∗[A′]− q]+.
Note that it depends on x as well as pi, but all the agents share the same gain regardless of their
current actions. As a result, the second order gain is zero; we could say that the choice of action in
the first revision does not change the gain in the second revision.45 With the total mass of agents
equal to one, the aggregate first-order gain G(pi, x) is now just equal to the individual first-order
gain: G(pi, x) = g∗(pi, x) · 1.
While the aggregate second-order gain cannot be used as a decay rate function H, we find that
the following function H works as the decay rate function coupled with G as a Lyapunov function
45In the interpretation as a birth-death process, we could simply say that mortal agents do not have the second
revision.
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to meet properties in Theorem 4. This functions is obtained from ∂G/∂x to meet property GH-i).
H(pi, x) = −
{
∑
A′⊂A
PA(A′)Q(pˆi∗[A′])
}{
∑
A′⊂A
PA(A′)Q(pˆi∗[A′])pˆi∗[A′]
}
.
Theorem 11. For a birth-death rationalizable dynamic that satisfies Assumptions Q1 and A1’, the pair of
the above defined functions G, H : RA ×X → R satisfies properties G, H, and GH as in Theorem 4.
Proof. G. i) G ≥ 0 is immediate as only the non-negative part of pi∗[A′] − x · pi − q is taken. ii)
If x ∈ ∆A(b∗[pi]), then pi∗[A′] − x · pi − q ≤ 0 for any q ≥ 0 and A′ ⊂ A; thus, we obtain
G(pi, x) = 0 by Assumption Q1-i). On the other hand, if x /∈ ∆A(b∗[pi]), then there is an action a
such that xa > 0 and pia < pi∗; for any optimal action b ∈ b∗(pi), this implies x · pi < pi∗ = pib.
Assumption A1’ guarantees that this action b is available with positive probability: there exists
A′ ⊂ A such that b ∈ A′ and PA(A′) > 0. As x · pi < pib = pi∗[A′] for this A′, Assumption
Q1 implies EQ [pi∗[A′]− x ·pi − q] > 0. Combining these two positives, we have Q∗(pi, x) ≥
PA(A′)EQ [pi∗[A′]− x ·pi − q] > 0.
H. This can be proven similarly to property G.
GH. i) As x enters G in the expectation term EQ [pi∗[A′]− x ·pi − q] , we have
∂G
∂x
(pi, x) = ∑
A′⊂A
PA(A′)Q(pi∗[A′]− x ·pi)(−pi).
This implies
∂G
∂x
(pi, x)∆x = − ∑
A′⊂A
PA(A′)Q(pi∗[A′]− x ·pi)pi · ∆x.
As we have seen above, for any ∆x ∈ V(x)[pi], we have
pi · ∆x = ∑
A′⊂A
PA(A′)Q(pi∗[A′]− x ·pi)(pi∗[A′]− x ·pi).
Therefore, we have
∂G
∂x
(pi, x)∆x = H(pi, x).
ii) Similarly to the proof of g2 in Lemma 1, we obtain
∂g∗
∂pi
(pi, x)∆pi = ∑
A′⊂A
PA(A′)Q(pi∗[A′]− x ·pi)(∆pi∗[A′]− x · ∆pi).
Notice that the LHS coincides with (∂G/∂∆pi)∆pi and the RHS is equal to ∆x · ∆pi for any ∆x ∈
V(x)[pi]. Therefore, we have
∂G
∂pi
(pi, x)∆pi =
∂g∗
∂pi
(pi, x)∆pi = ∆x · ∆pi for any ∆x ∈ V(x)[pi].
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To extend the stability result to a regular ESS, we need functions MU and NU . For a birth-death
rationalizable dynamic, we define them as
MU [pi](x) :=
{
∑
A′⊂A
PA(A′)Q(pˆi∗[A′])
}
∑
u∈U
xu, MU [pi](x) := NU [pi](x).
Note that pˆi∗[A′] ≡ max{pia | a ∈ A′} −pi · x is continuous in (pi, x); so do MU and NU .
Theorem 12. For a birth-death rationalizable dynamic that satisfies Assumptions Q1 and A1’, the pair of
the above defined functions MU , NU : RA ×X → R satisfies properties M, N, and MN as in Theorem 6.
Proof. Under a birth-death rationalizable dynamic V , a transition vector ∆x ∈ V(x)[pi] should
have a form such as
∆xa = ∑
A′⊂A
s.t. a∈b∗ [pi;A′]
PA(A′)Q(pˆia)y∗a[pi; A′]−
{
∑
A′⊂A
PA(A′)Q(pˆi∗[pi; A′])
}
xa for each a ∈ A,
(33)
with some y∗[pi; A′] ∈ ∆A(b∗[pi; A′]).
Given pi0, let pi0S := min{pi0s | s ∈ S}. Since x0u = 0 for any u ∈ U, any u ∈ U satisfies
pi0 · x0 = ∑
s∈S
pi0s x
0
s ≥ pi0S ∑
s∈S
x0s = pi
0
S > pi
0
u
and thus pˆi0u < 0. Define Π0 × X0 as a neighborhood to assure pˆi′′u = piu − x · pi < 0 for any
u ∈ U. Then, it follows by Assumption Q1-i) that Q(pˆiu) = 0 for any u ∈ U in the neighborhood.
Therefore, (33) reduces to
∆xu = −
{
∑
A′⊂A
PA(A′)Q(pˆi∗[pi; A′])
}
xu for each u ∈ U. (34)
∴ ∆xU = −
{
∑
A′⊂A
PA(A′)Q(pˆi∗[pi; A′])
}
xU ≡ −MU [pi](x).
If xU = 0, then MU [pi](x) = 0. Consider the case of xU > 0. Since pˆiu = piu − pi · x < 0 for all
u ∈ U, the assumption xU > 0 implies pˆis > 0 with some s ∈ S. It follows by Assumption Q1 that
Q(pˆis) > 0. With Assumption A1, this implies MU [pi](x) > 0 in this case. Therefore, this function
MU satisfies property M.
As seen from (34), there is no inflow to any action u ∈ U under a birth-death rationalizable
dynamic, i.e., ∆xu < 0. Therefore,
∑
u∈U
|∆xu| = ∑
u∈U
(−xu) = −xU = MU [pi](x) =: NU [pi](x).
Thus, property N is satisfied. It is immediate from the construction of NU as NU := MU to see that
property MN holds with C = 1.
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Corollary 9. Nash stability of a contractive game (Theorem 5) and local stability of a regular ESS (Corol-
lary 6) hold for birth-death rationalizable dynamics.
F Appendix to Section 7
F.1 Proofs of Theorems 7 and 8
Proof of Theorem 7. G. i) is immediately obtained from property G-i) of each Gp and the fact mp > 0.
For ii), notice that GP (xP ,piP ) = 0 is equivalent to Gp(xp,pip) = 0 for each p ∈ P . By property
G-ii) of each Gp, the latter is equivalent to xp ∈ mp∆Ap(b∗[pip]). Therefore, GP (xP ,piP ) = 0 is
equivalent to xP ∈Śp∈P mp∆Ap(b∗[pip]).
H. Each of the two parts can be readily verified from property H, similarly to the proof of property
G.
GH. First, notice that
∂GP
∂piP
(xP ,piP )∆piP = ∑
p∈P
∂Gp
∂pip
(xp,pip)∆pip for any ∆piP = (∆pip)p∈P ∈ RAP ;
∂GP
∂xP
(xP ,piP )∆xP = ∑
p∈P
∂Gp
∂xp
(xp,pip)∆xp for any ∆xP = (∆xp)p∈P ∈ RAP .
This implies property GH for P : for any ∆piP ∈ RAP and ∆xP ∈ VP (xP )[piP ], we have
i)
∂GP
∂piP
(xP ,piP )∆piP = ∑
p∈P
∂Gp
∂pip
(xp,pip)∆pip = ∑
p∈P
∆xp · ∆pip = ∆xP · ∆piP ,
ii)
∂GP
∂xP
(xP ,piP )∆xP = ∑
p∈P
∂Gp
∂xp
(xp,pip)∆xp = ∑
p∈P
Hp(xp,pip) = HP (xP ,piP )
Property GH for each population p ∈ P is used in the second equality on each of the two lines.
Proof of Theorem 8. It is immediate from the summation definition of MPU , N
P
U to see that properties
M-I and N are succeeded from those of each p ∈ P to P .
For property M-ii), consider the statement
xPU := ∑
p∈P
xpUp︷ ︸︸ ︷
∑
up∈Up
xpup = 0.
Since xpUp ≥ 0, this is equivalent to xpUp = 0 for all p ∈ P . By property M-ii) for each p ∈ P , this
is equivalent to MpUp = 0. This holds for all p ∈ P if and only if MPU = ∑p∈P MpUp = 0, thanks to
property M-i) for P .
For property MN, let CP := max{Cp | p ∈ P}. Then, for all p ∈ P , property MN holds with
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this CP :
CPMPU ≡ ∑
p∈P
CPMpUp ≥ ∑
p∈P
NpUp =: N
P
U .
F.2 Proof of Theorem 9
Proof. Fix xP , yP ∈ X P = (∆A)P arbitrarily. Let x¯, y¯ be their aggregates: x¯ = ∑q∈P xq and y¯ =
∑q∈P yq.
Notice that, under additive separability, we have
Fp(yP )− Fp(xP ) = F0(y¯)− F0(x¯).
Therefore, we have
(yP − xP ) · (FP (yP )− FP (xP )) = ∑
p∈P
(yp − xp) · (Fp(yP )− Fp(xP ))
=
{
∑
p∈P
(yp − xp)
}
· (F0(y¯)− F0(x¯)) = (y¯− x¯) · (F0(y¯)− F0(x¯)).
Hence, FP is contractive (resp., strictly contractive) if so is F0.
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